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Abstract
In recent years, the global defence market has changed, shifting from a seller’s market,
with limited suppliers facing a high demand, to a buyer’s market, in which growing num-
bers of suppliers compete for limited sales. In this intensely competitive environment, ex-
porters sell arms not only on the basis of price and quality, but also on the attractiveness of
the parallel offset package. Offset, crudely defined as ‘reciprocal investment’, is allegedly
prone to corruption. This debate has sparked a global controversy, and likely changed Eu-
ropean offset policy, albeit that no hard data exists to support the case that offset is tainted
with corruption. A 2010 Transparency International Report argued that corruption is en-
demic in offset programmes, but the evidence advanced by the report confuses defence
procurement with offset. Thus, the jury is still out as to whether corruption practices
are part and parcel of offset arrangements. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to
determine the nature and extent of corruption in UK defence offset programmes. Due
to the sensitivity of the topic, it was felt appropriate to focus attention on ethical com-
pliance as the primary research objective, and its application to offset as the secondary
goal. Senior representatives from three of the UK’s top aerospace and defence companies
were interviewed to establish the nature and degree of corporate ethical compliance at the
corporate, national and international levels. Analysis of the interview data was framed
against the 2008 Woolf Report recommendations. The overall research findings suggest
that the UK companies operate a rigorous and robust set of ethical compliance measures,
covering commercial activities, including offset. This supports a conclusion that broad-
based UK defence-related ethical compliance procedures are some of the most stringent
in the world. Whilst corruption allegations still surface, they are rooted in historical arms
deals contracted before implementation of the Woolf Reports recommendations.
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Chapter 1
Trading in Murky Waters?
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, the global defence market has changed significantly, shifting from a
seller’s market, with a few suppliers meeting a high demand, to a buyer’s market (with
more suppliers than buying countries). Since the 1970s, as a result of increased com-
petitiveness, offset, defined crudely as reciprocal investment, started to proliferate and
became a popular and attractive option to boost employment and to support the econ-
omy, particularly those of emerging countries.1 Offset is now a lucrative business, with
reportedly some 130 countries worldwide having offset policies in place.2 According to
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Gulf Cooperation Countries
(GCC) are expected to spend about 1 trillion USD dollars on defence between 2013 and
2025.3 SIPRI also estimates that 105 billion USD dollars could be either reinvested or
sourced domestically in the form of offset, creating more than 280,000 jobs, 84,000 in
Saudi Arabia alone.4 This would result in an economic boost for Saudi Arabia and could
potentially fuel demand for offset in other developing countries. So in more detail, what
is offset? Most analysts define offset as an agreement where the buying country obliges
1
a foreign supplier to reinvest a proportion of contract value in the buying country, with
the final aim being to improve its social and economic standards or its technological ca-
pabilities. Offset is divided into two main categories, namely direct and indirect offset.
Direct offset relates directly to defence acquisition, whilst indirect offset is unrelated to
the defence acquisition.5
Offset agreements can involve a wide range of reciprocal benefits, such as investing in
Research and Development (RD), building new universities and facilitating technology
transfer. Technology transfer, for example, is particularly attractive to countries that lack
the expertise and the resources for manufacturing the product they purchase and require
to import skills from overseas. The benefits from these opportunities accrue to the buying
country, but sometimes it is not economically viable due to offset demands, that some-
times, exceed 100% of the main contract value.
Although offset represents an attractive investment opportunity and can be of tremendous
gain, there are drawbacks to offset arrangements including its arguable susceptibility to
corruption. Thus, offset has become a very sensitive topic.6
In earlier research, offset has been criticised for its lack of transparency.7 One of the
biggest problems with offset is its complexity and ‘secrecy’. It has been argued by Trans-
parency International that this lack of transparency is responsible for significant corrup-
tion risks.8 Offset is difficult to monitor because the offset costs9 are commonly hidden
in the main purchasing contract and also they are not subject to a dedicated auditing
process.10 Indeed, an earlier study published in 2013 found no publicly available audits
of offset contract performance.11 Transparency in defence offset arrangements is further
hindered by the fact that the details of defence acquisition programmes are often obscured
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due to national security.12
Another issue with offset is that to benefit from them, the buying country often has to
contract external consultants and service providers. This can potentially create further
opportunities for corruption, negatively impacting on the reputation of a foreign supplier.
In 2013, law firm Latham & Watkins noted that ‘over half of all aerospace and defence
industry enforcement actions involved bribe payments by third-party agents working on
behalf of aerospace and defence companies’.13
Indirect offset has also attracted criticism. This is because it has a more flexible approach
than direct offset, as it is unrelated to the subject of the acquisition, and thus more difficult
to track. In addition to potential corruption risks, indirect offset also poses an economic
risk, as it often remains impossible to establish the extent of the resulting benefits.
The performance phase of an offset can encourage corruption activity. Offset agents often
have strong connections to national defence establishments. For example, they are usu-
ally former military personnel or public officials and may be tempted to solicit bribes in
exchange for an award credit to offset the offset obligation.14 Also, the payment of bribes
can take the form of payments into third party bank accounts. Moreover, each country
has different offset demands and the award of the credit is not usually in monetary value,
which makes it even more difficult to track and monitor and also less transparent.15
Government plays an integral role in a defence offset package. The attractiveness of
the offset programme can be improperly used to influence the primary defence contract.16
For example, in 1999, South African government officials allegedly received bribes to
help fund the election campaign.17 This highlights that poor transparency can potentially
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lead to bribery and corruption in offset.18
International defence and acquisition governing bodies have implemented new policies
to raise awareness of transparency in offset programmes. The European Defence Agency
(EDA) for instance launched a code of conduct in July 2009 to increase awareness of
offset programmes in European countries; all 25 countries were requested to voluntarily
disclose their offset policies and guidelines public on the EDA website.19
Additionally, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
has criticised the UK for inadequacies in its bribery laws (UK Bribery Bill Draft). It
has encouraged the UK Ministry of Justice to replace the existing framework to help fight
corruption both, within the United Kingdom and in relation to international business.20
An in depth research study carried out by Feinstein identified a number of key issues in
the structure and methods of the arms trade.21 He argues that this is fertile ground for
corruption and other illicit practices.22
Although Transparency International has argued that offset is prone to corruption there
is a lack of empirical evidence to support such arguments. Peter Platzgummer also men-
tions that there is a lack of quantitative data on corruption in offset, stating that only a
few cases of corruption have been widely discussed.23 All of the above problems raise
questions regarding the need to establish the nature and extent of corruption in offset.
1.2 Research Questions
The main questions that lie at the heart of this study are: does corruption exist in defence
offset programmes, and if so, to what extent?
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1.2.1 Study Aim
The aim of this study is to explore the potential for corruption in UK defence offset pro-
grammes. To achieve the above study aim, the following objectives need to be achieved.
1.2.2 Enabling Objectives
This study’s objectives are to:
• Offer a definitional taxonomy of corruption and analyse the implications of corrup-
tion
• Identify the nature and extent of corruption in defence and offset
• Determine whether corruption is associated with certain types of offset
• Assess the effectiveness of compliance, corporate ethics and regulatory control in
the defence environment, especially in relation to offset
• Draw conclusions, and offer appropriate recommendations for government and in-
dustry to improve transparency and compliance
1.3 Study Value
The contribution of this study is linked to the fact that to this point there has not been any
credible independent evaluation of the existence of corruption in defence offset. Offset
in defence markets has attracted criticism globally, and, thus invited public scrutiny and
speculation over the existence of corruption in offset programmes. However, there has
been a lack of hard data to ‘prove’ that corruption is prevalent in defence offset arrange-
ments.
5
1.4 Conceptual Framework
Corruption in offset is a controversial phenomenon, and it has proved difficult to deter-
mine if corruption exist in offset programmes. To assess the effectiveness of the ethical
and legal systems employed to reduce the potential for corruption in defence offset, three
levels of analysis will be employed. This study employs a conceptual framework, illus-
trated in Figure 1.1, to determine the nature and extent of corruption. Ethical compliance
Figure 1.1: Conceptual model
Transparency and 
Accountability in 
Defence and Offset
Organisational
Corporate Ethics
National Legislation 
in the UK
International Norms 
Values & Guidelines
Source: author
and ethics is a fundamental feature of any organisation to protect and regulate behaviour
of employees and other workers engaged in company project. The activities are consid-
ered to be critical functions and consequently also important in combatting and detect-
ing corruption in an organisation. All employees have an obligation to understand their
ethical role and engage ethically in day to day operations. An organization must have
standards and procedures of conduct and internal controls in place to help deter criminal
and improper conduct. This requirement is termed as a ‘code of conduct’, establishing
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key principles and values that dictate expected levels of behaviour of an employee within
an organisation. The code should also identify the clear channels for reporting miscon-
duct and clarify the procedures to follow when the code is violated. These practices serve
as the backbone to a company’s operational conduct. All ethical requirements should be
accessible to all employees, and need to be clear and effective.
The first stage in the conceptual model analyses the corporate ethical framework at an
organizational level. The aim is to identify any weaknesses in the defence corporate eth-
ical system. In order to evaluate ethical corporate policies, a number of interviews were
held with the senior ethics compliance officers and Directors of governance at top UK de-
fence companies to help identify the risks of corruption and the steps taken to safeguard
the company brand.
UK defence companies have a legal responsibility to comply with the national legislative
requirements set out by the UK government. Failure to comply leads to both reputational
and financial risk.
The second level of analysis is an assessment of the national legislative framework that
acts to ensure UK defence companies adhere to the UK governance requirements, reduc-
ing the potential for bribery and corruption. The UK legislative criteria aimed at combat-
ting bribery is the Bribery Act, which is considered as one of the most powerful weapons
to fight bribery in the UK and abroad. UK defence companies have an obligation to com-
ply with all national anti-corruption practices. Part of the interviews undertaken will be
devoted to establishing whether, and how, UK defence companies ensure compliance with
the national legislative framework, principally the Bribery Act.
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The UK aerospace and defence industry is the fourth largest in the world, and the third
largest in Europe, with a global market share in 2016 valued at 6.4%.24 This confirms the
success of UK defence exports , at the same time, indicates the importance of UK’s strong
international export presence in countries across the Middle East, Asia, North America
and Europe. Having said this, international compliance in defence exports is a critical
issue. UK defence companies have an obligation to undertake business in foreign markets
in an ethical manner whilst adhering to the national company policies and international
compliance. Companies also need to be vigilant in detecting bribery and corruption due
to the different political and economic geographical dimensions.
The third level of analysis aims to assess whether, and how, UK defence contractors
achieve compliance with the legislative requirements and offset guidelines in overseas
countries, so protecting the UK brand. It is important that ethical and legal compliance
is achieved throughout the life cycle of business conduct, thus eliminating the risk of
potential corruption.
1.5 Research Methodology
In this section, various research philosophies, research strategies and methodologies are
presented, some of which will be deemed appropriate to the development of the research
design in the present study.
1.5.1 Nature of Research
Understanding the nature of research and its purpose has attracted considerable interest.
According to Walliman, research cannot be simply defined as the collection of data and
8
information.25 Research is instead something that people undertake to discover, in a log-
ical and a systematic way, the means of contributing to knowledge. Data collection is
the process of inquiry and investigation, which is a part of the research that needs to be
carried out with a clear purpose. Research has also been defined as an inquiry, consisting
of two main elements: the process and the product.26 The process is the area of inquiry
and how it is fulfilled, and the product is the knowledge generated from the process and
its evaluation. Research may have multiple objectives. According to Ghauri, these may
include explaining, understanding, criticising and analysing.27 Research philosophy is the
study of the underlying philosophical assumptions in which researchers view the world,
as well as the study of their own perceptions. The choice of a philosophical research ap-
proach is the reflection of the researcher’s values and the methods selected to collect and
analyse data are based on how the researcher believes the world can be seen. Research
philosophies can be thought of as a lens through which a researcher can see the world.
To conduct sound research, it is important to understand the assumptions that will form
the research strategy and the reasons why a specific research method has been selected
to develop the research design. The ‘onion’, as shown in Figure 1.2, is a diagrammatic
framework developed by Mark Saunders on research philosophies and methods.28
Higher Level Research Perspectives
For the purpose of this study, a subset of research perspectives has been carefully selected
from the research onion in Figure 1.2. These higher-level research perspectives will be
employed in the research process to help understand the study. It is a very important tool
to understanding and carefully selecting a suitable research strategy and method when
planning and carrying out research. There is a wide range of research philosophies and
two of these (interpretivism and pragmatism) will be selected, emphasising flexibility.
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Figure 1.2: Research options
Secondary 
and 
Empirical 
Data
Cross
Sectional
Longitudinal
Experiment
Survey
Case Study
Grounded 
Theory
Ethnography
Action Research
Deductive
Inductive
Positivism
Interpretivism
Research
philosophy
Research 
approaches
Research StrategiesTime HorizonsData Collection Methods
Pragmatism
Source: Mark Saunders et al, “Research methods for business students”, Prentice Hall,
2012.29
The philosophical approaches are commonly reflected in the empirical research. The pos-
itivistic principle applies to the natural sciences, whereas, the interpretivist and pragmatist
approaches relate to the social science.30
Positivism: the positivist approach originally came from the natural sciences. This ap-
proach is concerned with observing and predicting outcomes. A positivist stance adopts
what is referred to as scientific techniques to propose and test theories in a structured en-
vironment. The positivist tends to establish relationships between two or more variables.
This involves the collection of data through quantifiable measures in a value-free and
objective manner so that the researcher is not influenced by his values.31 Interpretivism:
the interpretivist approach is a strategy of inquiry deriving from philosophy and psychol-
ogy. Researchers interpret the experiences of individuals about a particular phenomenon
through the individual’s experiences.32 The focus of this approach is the carrying out of
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research through people rather than objects. Data are collected through the use of quali-
tative data by interviewing people and understanding the differing perceptions and expe-
riences from a wider audience. Unlike the positivist stance, the researcher is value-bound
on what is being researched a function of a particular set of circumstances and individuals
at a specific point in time.33 A qualitative study can be used to gain a richer insight into
the problem and to understand the worldview through human participants. Therefore, this
study requires an understanding of the nature and extent of corruption in defence offset
programmes and needs to be understood from the researchers point of view which relates
more to the interpretivist stance with its focus on human interests, meanings and under-
standing of what is happening in specific contexts. The pragmatic perspective adopts a
worldview approach where the emphasis is placed on the research question and employs
all a mix of research approaches to understand the problem.34 This strand of philosophy
incorporates both quantitative and qualitative methods and by using different approaches
on the basis that they will be complementary.35
1.5.2 Deductive vs Inductive Research
There are two key concepts that researchers use in research and these are known as the de-
ductive and inductive approaches. Generally, the deductive approach is testing the theory
through the means of empirical data.36 This is when the researcher draws a theory based
on what is known and this needs to be assessed through an empirical inquiry, which is the
collection of data. This type of approach lends itself to a quantitative evaluation.37 The
researcher then needs to establish a collection data method to test the truth. By contrast
the inductive approach, collects data to develop a theory.38 This approach requires the
researcher to provide empirical generalizations based on the data collection to develop a
theory, and the data is linked to a theory through qualitative methods.
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1.5.3 Research Strategies
It can be quite challenging to select a research strategy. The selection of a strategy can be
guided through the research questions and aims. There are different research approaches
to choose from in order to conduct a research study and these can be used for exploratory,
descriptive and explanatory research.39
Experiment
An experiment is an investigation in which a hypothesis is scientifically tested. In an
experiment, an independent variable (the cause) is manipulated to carry out a test and
allow further investigations. Saunders confirms that in the social sciences the validity of
this strategy is difficult to be generalized because of the uncertainties of real life situations
involve human subjects.40
Survey
A survey is an exploratory way of conducting research of different behaviour and many
disciplines. Experiments are carried out in a controlled manner, whereas surveys are more
exploratory in nature, providing answers to research questions such as the ‘how’, ‘why’
and ‘what’. Surveys are popular as they allow for the collection of a large amount of data
over a sizable population which then can be further analysed to gain a better understanding
of the subject area.41 This falls under the deductive approach. Surveys can take the form
of a questionnaire or of structured observations such as an interview.
Case Study
The case study has been widely used in a wide range of disciplines including psychol-
ogy, sociology, political science, business and social work. Yin defines a case study as
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a research strategy for doing research, which undertakes an empirical investigation of a
particular study, within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence.42 This is a
method which encompasses a logical inquiry by using a prescribed data collection tech-
nique and data analysis making it a comprehensive research strategy. There are certain
features that define a case study strategy as being reliable, this is when the research is able
to evaluate multiple sources within the case study research which could provide answers
to common questions. Case studies rely on multiple sources of information and this is
referred to as triangulation.
Grounded Theory
Grounded theory is a strategy to understand the phenomenon under investigation. Re-
searchers can employ various strategies which include comparative analysis, theoretical
sampling and data collection. This approach adopts a combination of induction and de-
duction to build the theory.43 In grounded theory, relationships between data are identified
to develop questions and a hypothesis to test,44 so that a new theory can emerge from data
collection analysis. Identifying themes or issues from the collected data (coding) is key
in grounded theory.
Action Research
Action research is a common approach used in the social science and can also be referred
to as participant research. This strategy requires the researcher to be part of the organisa-
tion in order to diagnose a problem within the organisation, and then to propose a suitable
solution to the problem. This involves a logical process of enquiry, monitoring, evaluation
and actioning and can take place over time.
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Ethnography
Ethnography is when the researcher becomes part of the study to understand the situation
from an inside’s perspective.45
1.5.4 Pilot Study
In social science the term ‘pilot study’ can be used in two ways. One is to indicate a
feasibility study, which is a trial run, and the other is to indicate a pilot study, which is a
pre-testing of a particular research instrument.46 The advantage of a pilot study is that it
helps the researcher gain valuable insights into possible practical problems.
1.5.5 Time Horizons
Research can be undertaken in two different ways with respect to the research time frame,
cross-sectionally or longitudinally. The cross-sectional study concerns a particular phe-
nomenon that often employs a survey strategy, which takes place in the current time
horizon.47 By contrast the cross-sectional study is taken over a longer period of time in
which people and events can be observed for longer and the researcher is able to exercise
a measure of control over the variables been studied. This provides a deeper analysis of
developments over a length of time.48
1.5.6 Research Methods
The research method is a strategy of enquiry, which moves from the underlying assump-
tions to research design and data collection.49 It is therefore important to identify the
research methods to be used in a research project to also help with an understanding of
the area of research. The most common classification of research methods identifies two
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main options, namely the quantitative and the qualitative approaches. These are two tra-
ditional research methods play an instrumental role in collecting and analysing the data.
Both offer the means of addressing a research problem but in different ways.
Quantitative vs Qualitative Methods
A quantitative methodology interprets the data by presenting it with the use of numbers
as measurements or indicators of relevant variables to help researchers make sense of
the research problem. Quantitative research makes use of questionnaires, surveys, and
experiments to collect data that then can be interpreted in a statistical way. It focuses on
the presentation of data in the form of a numerical or a statistical analysis. There is a clear
distinction between the qualitative and quantitative methods. By contrast, a qualitative
approach presents the data as descriptive narration with words, and attempts to understand
the phenomena in their natural settings.50 Qualitative research has an investigative and
exploratory nature, due to the lack of knowledge about the problem. It used in research to
used to understand the human experiences and perspectives of the problem. When using
this approach, the researcher needs to be mindful that this method is open to bias and
manipulation.
Interviews
An interview is a purposeful discussion between two or more people.51 Interviews are one
of the one most widely used instruments in qualitative research. There are many types of
interviews which can include, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. Interviews
are carried out to help identify the key issues or links in the study. Structured interviews
use questionnaires based on a set of planned questions and are conducted in a predeter-
mined way. In this study’s research, the interviewer has a set number of questions based
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on topics the researcher wants covered in the interview. Semi-structured interviews will
be used to collect quantifiable data that can be analysed. When interviewing, the inter-
pretation of body language provides an important signal to understand the respondents’
perceptions and feelings towards the question and the subject area.52 Researchers should
be made aware of body movements and characteristics, non-verbal aspects of speech, or
a delay in communication to responses.53
Although the interview focuses on key topics, the interviewer has the opportunity to ex-
plore answers more widely. There is a predetermined list of questions, and the selected
interview technique allows the researcher to gain an in-depth understanding of the study.
This can be an effective way to gather detailed responses as opposed to telephone calls.
The use of semi-structured face-to-face tends to have a limited number of pre-defined
topics to discuss in an open-ended fashion. The advantage of such interviews is that they
allow the researcher to seek clarity when answers are unclear. However, there are draw-
backs to this research style. Due to the limited time, respondents are expected to provide
an immediate response without the time needed for thought processing. In this research,
this was minimised by providing the questionnaire in advance to respondents. Trust is an
important feature in the interviewing process and could impact on the interviewing pro-
cedure in disclosing sensitive information. This can be minimized by advising the inter-
viewees that all information is confidential, anonymised and saved in a secure database.54
Secondary Data
Secondary data results from reviewing the previous literature and critically evaluating the
work that has been carried out in the study area of the project.55
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Sampling
It is important to determine the sample size based on the research questions and aims
of the project.56 There are a wide variety of sampling techniques available that can be
used, such as random sampling, theoretical sampling and purposive sampling. In random
sampling the sample is selected randomly. According to Glauser and Strauss theoretical
sampling generates a collection of data to develop a theory.57 Purposive sampling involves
using a non-probability form of sample which means that the researcher does not use
a random sample. This form of sampling aims to select participants that are matched
strategically against the population size. This type of sampling can include organizations,
people and departments that need to reflect the aims of the project.58 This type of sampling
can be used in qualitative research, such as interviews and it is important for the researcher
in selecting a wider population so that many individuals are reached to gain insights into
the study field.
Questionnaire
The use of a questionnaire is a popular data collection method. The weakness is that an-
swers cannot be controlled. The limitations of the research methods have to be considered
when determining the results. The strength of this approach lies in its ability to collect a
large quantity of data from a sizable population.59 Thus it is key that answers provided by
research subjects need to be answered without bias. The risk of surveys is that there could
be a possible bias on how the interviewee answers the questions. Answers may represent
a positive image and lie behind the truth. Questionnaires can be useful to measure the
perceptions of people and attitudes towards a subject area. A large sample size carries the
benefits of ensuring that the findings are more representative of the population.
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1.6 Research Design
A research design is a logical task undertaken to ensure that the evidence collected en-
ables the researcher to fulfill the research. The research stance used in this research is
shown in Figure 1.3 and falls between interpretivism and pragmatism, to understand and
interpret human perceptions and views of subjects in the defence community. This can
influence the research methods as to how the research should be undertaken, and the ap-
propriate selection methods that can be employed to collect the data. The chosen research
method is a case study consisting of interviews and surveys. This case study is framed by
the ‘how’ and ‘why’ research question, by examining a subject within its context in order
to understand the subject. However, before embarking on the case study, it was necessary
to pursue content analysis, searching specialised newspaper articles and online sources to
understand the problem.
Figure 1.3: Research Process
Source: Mark Saunders et al, “Research methods for business students”, Prentice Hall,
2012.60
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The deductive approach will be used by drawing on the literature in both corruption and
offset to explore the boundaries of the topic. A case study approach of the UK aerospace
and defence sector is adopted. In order to determine the potential for corruption in the UK
defence, alongside offset programmes data will be collected through an empirical inquiry
by means of semi-structured interviews. This study selected face-to-face interviews to
allow the researcher to collect information about the attitudes and behaviours towards the
subject. The present case study strategy of analysis uses data triangulation which is held
to validate the accuracy of the data and findings.61 The triangulation tool is used to ensure
validity of the research findings as it provides more than one source of evidence to cross-
examine the research findings before a researcher is able to reach a certain conclusion.
Three converging lines of inquiry shown in Figure 1.4 will include three multiple sources:
secondary data, a survey and a case study. In the case study analysis, relevant data were
collected through secondary and primary sources: interviews and survey. Secondary data
will be the key source of data in this research study. A literature survey will be carried
out to review journals, specialized publications, governmental material, quality newspa-
pers and published books. The semi-structured interviews were used with questionnaires
to collect data. This conforms to the interpretivist research approach of using multiple
methods in order to understand different views of phenomena and to explore the sub-
jective aspects of the case study. A pilot test was run. Feedback was provided in the
pilot test on the layout and structuring to ensure open-ended questions were placed before
closed-ended questions. A set of predefined research questions were carefully designed
to test the effectiveness of the defence ethical corporate framework, compliance and also
to gauge an understanding of compliance effectiveness. A copy of this can be found in
Appendix B Questionnaire. A sample was selected from the aerospace and defence sector.
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Figure 1.4: Triangulation model
Research 
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Source: author
A sample comprising the 11 leading UK defence companies was selected from aerospace
and defence company population. Three of the biggest companies agreed to participate in
the survey, representing a response rate of 27%. On the basis of their defence sales, these
three firms account for between 40-50% of the UK aerospace and defence population.62
Although the number of survey participants are small, their size and contribution to the
UK aerospace defence sales is disproportionally large, indicating that the survey findings
is broadly representative of the population.
1.6.1 Interview Procedure
Firstly, due to the sensitivity of the subject, the interview process had to be carefully man-
aged. Prior to each interview request, an introductory email was sent to the companies,
on behalf of the researcher by the UK Aerospace, Defence, Security and Space Sector
Group (ADS) to help gain access to contacts. Some companies expressed their willing-
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ness to support the project, however, others expressed a concern on confidentiality. Each
participant was provided with a follow up email explaining the nature of the research and
the intended project aims with an attached copy of the questionnaire. Appointments were
scheduled with each participant who confirmed with a map attached. Prior to accepting
the interviews, a telephone call was requested by the companies to ensure confidentiality
and additional details on the intended aims of the project were provided when necessary.
The location of the defence companies varied within the UK. Out of the top 11 firms, 4
top firms accepted the invite to participate, with one cancelling two days before the inter-
view date. An alternative contact was provided to the researcher to continue the meeting.
The researcher immediately contacted the company notifying the key participant to es-
tablish contact, however, the company failed to respond back. Due to the project time
constraints the interview could not be progressed. The researcher had to ensure the par-
ticipants confidentiality was protected informing the participants that all data obtained
would be strictly protected under the university’s policies. All participants were provided
an informed consent form immediately after the interview. One company refused to sign
this. This provided a formal acknowledgement of confidentiality in handling the infor-
mation. The participants were also given the opportunity to withdraw from the research,
by providing a written notice within 7 days after the interview. During the interview, the
body language and expressions of the participants were observed to be able to gauge if
questions were difficult.
All hand written notes were immediately transcribed and keyed into the computer using
the questionnaire document. A separate folder was set up and sub-folders were recorded
in a systematic way by using an alpha code. All questionnaires were suitably hand coded
and a designated folder for each respondent was generated and coded accordingly. Each
participant was provided with an alphabetical code. Primary data, were ranked according
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to theme headings based on the questionnaire. This was then analysed using Microsoft
Excel. Coding allows the researcher to group similarities and differences together.63 This
was done to allow the researcher to understand the various narrative perspectives of the
ethical framework and offset but also, to make sense of the participants views. The data
were sorted and categories of information compiled. Some of the participants’ responses
were audio recorded to validate written notes and ensure accuracy and to avoid misinter-
pretation. The recordings were downloaded to a secure network as an MP4 file and later
transcribed by selecting only relevant information. The transcribed responses were cross-
checked against the written data. Corporate ethics in defence and offset were the central
focus of the study, and company names cannot be disclosed due to the sensitivity of the
study. Non-verbal communication in an interview for a researcher is just as important as
responses, and this could give an indication on how the participants perceived the ques-
tions. It was always ensured eye contact was always maintained and that the interviewer’s
body language was such to communicate the respondents’ openness and honesty.64 The
Table 1.1: Top 11 UK defence suppliers
Company Area of Study
Airbus Corporate ethical framework
Babcock Corporate ethical framework
BAE Systems Corporate ethical framework
Boeing UK Corporate ethical framework
General Dynamics Corporate ethical framework
Leonardo Corporate ethical framework
Lockheed Martin Corporate ethical framework
QinetiQ Corporate ethical framework
Rolls-Royce Corporate ethical framework
Serco Corporate ethical framework
Thales Corporate ethical framework
Source: UK Aerospace, Defence Security and Space (ADS).
time allowed for each interview was between 45 minutes to 1 hour, however, some of the
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interviews allowed for extra time. The location of the interview was at the respondent
company office.
1.6.2 Time Horizons
A cross-sectional approach was employed to collect data using at a point in time.
1.6.3 Ethical Considerations
Ethics play an integral role in the research journey. Research ethics is a key ingredient
which represents the appropriate standards of behaviour that need to be met throughout
the life cycle of the research design phase, to ensure that no potential harm is caused to the
participants. The nature of this study is sensitive and, accordingly had to be approached
under the following conditions:
(1) In carrying out the field research, the researcher introduced the university and ex-
plained the purpose of the research and intentions behind the data collection.
(2) Ethics and offset are both of a sensitive nature and controversial topics. Due to the
sensitivity of the subject, the participants had to be fully briefed on the aim of the research
project. The researcher declared that all data collected would be treated with the strictest
levels of confidence in accordance with the university data protection policy.
(3) The questionnaire was also provided to give the participants an insight to the questions
so that, if they were unsure of any information, they could seek clarity from the researcher
in advance. The researcher had to clarify to the participants issues regarding the protec-
tion of data, offering a thesis copy to each of the participating companies.
(4) An informed consent form was provided to each participating company once the in-
terview concluded.
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The following ethical considerations were taken into account throughout the fieldwork:
participants must understand the nature of the case study and its implications; the exis-
tence of research risks to interviewees that could be harmful; data collection designed to
ensure results are reported accurately and objectively; and any impact on privacy during
data collection.
In order to carry out this study, prior approval was granted by the Research Ethics Com-
mittee of Cranfield University to review and approve ethical clearance for the fieldwork
to be conducted.
1.7 Study Structure
Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 will construct a taxonomy of corruption.
The aim of this chapter is to understand the definitional scope of corruption and the impact
and cost of corruption. Chapter 3 then progresses to define and examine the nature of
defence offset. This chapter will present the background knowledge of defence offset.
Chapter 4 will critically analyse the extent of corruption in defence offset, globally. After
this, Chapter 5 will examine the data obtained from the survey, using semi-structured
questionnaires, to reveal possible weaknesses in UK offset compliance according to the
conceptual model outlined in Figure 1.1. The closing Chapter will present conclusions
from the analysis based on the findings. A set of recommendations will then be offered to
promote policy improvements and suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Concepts, Causes and Consequences of
Corruption
2.1 Introduction
Corruption is a historical issue. Bribes were received in Egypt, and in Babylonian and He-
brew societies. In Rome, they were seen as a common feature of the election procedure
for public office. Van Klavern argues that in modern societies corruption is common and
that there is no separation between public and private interest.1 He believes that corruption
is a historical phenomenon and a problem that has never been dealt with systematically.
In modern history, corruption existed in the 18th and 19th centuries. For example, in the
18th century, scandals were centred on prominent British figures in East India who be-
came very rich through corrupt practices and who later returned to Britain to spread their
corrupt ways. For example, Thomas Rumbold was a noble figure who sought to combine
private interest and the means of state and company services, abusing his official position
in India to gain personal advantage. On his return to Britain in the 1870s, his personal
gains obtained through illegal practices led him to purchase a parliamentary seat through
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deceptive activities. As a result of this, a parliamentary inquiry was opened and he was
eventually fined for breaching public trust. Rumbold denied the allegations of corruption
and it is believed that he attempted to bribe some individuals involved in the proceed-
ings. Historians in England refer to this time as that of “Old Corruption”.2 The term Old
Corruption is used in a narrow sense to indicate the widespread use of financial benefits
granted to British government officials to bribe, reward or buy privilege. It became an en-
demic feature of British politics in this period.3 The relationship between corruption and
economic growth has attracted significant attention in the academic literature. Bardhan,
for example, argues that
“although the requisite time-series evidence in terms of hard data is absent,
circumstantial evidence suggests that over the last 100 years or so corruption
has generally declined with economic growth in most rich countries.”4
Corruption is a complex subject. Against this historical backdrop, the aim of this section
is to provide a conceptual understanding of the phenomenon. In order to understand the
problem, the key features of corruption are identified by reviewing previous work carried
out on the subject. The impact, consequences and causes of corruption are explored to
offer a critical evaluation of the techniques used to measure the various forms of corrup-
tion. Chapter 1, has shown how offset has been criticized by Transparency International
based on its lack of transparency and accountability.5
2.2 Defining Corruption
The 2016 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) shows that in to-
day’s world corruption has impacted on both rich and poor countries in many parts of the
globe.6 Indeed, corruption has become a global phenomenon that has attracted widespread
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interest in the academic sphere and the political front.
Corruption is an evil in societal behaviour and can be perceived as a malfunction of poor
governance that reduces economic growth, lowers private investment and undermines a
country’s political and economic standards. It is a behaviour which deviates from the for-
mal duties of a public or civil role and destroys trust in government, business, markets and
countries. The battle to fight corruption has been challenging globally, and can be clas-
sified as a cancer with no existing cure, despite all the legal initiatives that have evolved,
and are still constantly evolving, to stamp out the problem.
Although corruption remains, anti-corruption initiatives have registered some success.
The UK Bribery Act was passed in 2010 as a legal framework to prevent bribery in com-
mercial organisations and other criminal acts. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
was introduced in the United States to rule on any form of corrupt practices. The OECD
has also taken strong measures in eradicating corruption on a global scale by enforcing
anti-bribery conventions to prevent, detect and investigate bribery. Forty one countries
agreed to its conventions under which they are mandated to adopt the recommendations
for combating bribery of public officials in international business transactions. Additional
legal enforcement agencies, such as the FCO and SFO, have also designed a two year anti-
corruption programme with Australia, Canada, the EU and the US to combat the “cancer”
of corruption.7
Corruption encompasses various acts. It is difficult to determine a precise definition of
corruption due to its complex and covert nature. A single definition of corruption does
not exist in the literature, and there is an ongoing debate between different schools of
thought to define corruption. So, how do these schools of thought perceive corruption?
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Corruption can be defined in simple terms as unlawful and illegal acts which can take
many forms, such as bribery, fraud, money laundering, embezzlement of funds, improper
political contributions and nepotism. A common feature of these acts is that they all de-
viate from the organisational ethical practices and standards of behaviour.8
Transparency International, a world leading authority on corruption prevention, defines
corruption as ‘‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” and this definition is com-
monly cited by a wide range of experts, academics, organisations and other anti-corruption
bodies. The World Bank uses a more general definition of corruption as “the abuse of pub-
lic office for private gain”.9 Heidenheimer and Johnston offer a three-pronged approach
and argue that corruption can be associated with public-office-centred behaviour, imply-
ing that it is a deviation from duties in public office, and market-centred behaviour of
civil servants, which causes harm to the public interest.10 A similar view was expressed
by the UN Global Programme against Corruption that defined corruption as “an abuse of
public power for private gain that hampers the public interest”.11 Robert Klitgaard offers
a broader definition of corruption as a set of:“promises and threats” and argues that it
“can be initiated by a public servant or an interested client” and that it “can entail acts
of commission, and can involve illicit services which can take place inside or outside a
public organization”.12 An alternative and comprehensive definition of corruption was
proposed by Fitzpatrick who stated that corruption can be seen as a
“consensual crime shrouded in secrecy. The participants are willing, con-
senting and happy. Not a crime of passion, corruption thrives on secrecy and
silence. It is only when a person feels cheated by a rare sense of duty and
loyalty that he will report an instance of corruption. Rarely does a partici-
pant have an interest in revealing the deal. Few crimes are as hard to prove.
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Perceived to be a victimless crime, it nevertheless has a devastating effect on
our livelihood”.13
This definition supports the belief that corruption is a hidden crime that thrives under se-
cretive environments. People involved in corruption cases are not often open to speak up,
and as a result, corruption is very hard to prove. Although various definitions of corrup-
tion have been proposed, there is a general consensus in the existing literature to associate
corruption with the abuse for public office.14 The next section will offer a definitional
scope of corruption.
2.2.1 Taxonomy of Corruption
The ‘c’ word, corruption, encompasses many forms of illegal acts, which include bribery,
embezzlement, fraud, extortion, conflict of interest and improper political contributions.
The aim of this section is to provide a taxonomy of corruption.
Figure 2.1 shows a typical classification of corruption that can be used for a wide range
of disciplines and that can be applied to the private and public sectors, nationally and in-
ternationally. Corruption can be classified into two main categories, petty corruption and
grand corruption. Petty corruption consists of isolated transactions made by either public
officials or individuals who can abuse their power to demand bribes and kickbacks, diver-
sion of funds, or awarding in favour of a personal reward. It often involves governmental
bodies with public officials that maintain a certain level of discretionary power and who
can access public services and goods.15 Grand corruption, on the other hand, occurs on a
much larger scale and involves vast sums of money. It can occur at a governmental level;
for example, a supplier that solicits bribes from officials to secure a public contract.16
Jain describes grand corruption that involves political elite parties who abuse their power
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Figure 2.1: Taxonomy of Corruption
Source: author
of authority in the decision making process of financial policies, defence contracts, con-
struction and large infrastructure contracts.17 Both petty and grand corruption can include
bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion and conflict of interest. The corrupt activities
characterised under this taxonomy are illegal in most countries.18
The OECD describes bribery “as an offer or promise in order to influence a public offi-
cial’s decisions to achieve a desired outcome”. Bribery is understood to be a paid amount
of money that is given or taken between parties or individuals in return of a benefit. It is
perceived as one of the most common forms of corruption.19 Benefits can be of a monetary
value or intangible. For example, a bribe can be paid to an official by a supplier in order
to win a contract.20 Because bribery is an exchange between two parties, there is a supply
side (the briber) and a demand side (the public official).21 Bribes can also be referred to
as kickbacks, gratuities, sweeteners and pay-offs. Extortion occurs when an individual
(the victim) is forced or threatened to pay a sum of money to someone else. For example,
an official can be forced to make a corrupt payment to a person that uses some form of
threat for the favour to be initiated.22 Extortion is an extreme version of bribery that in-
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volves a force or pressure (unlike common bribery where engaging parties all consent to
participate). Embezzlement is the theft of money or property by an individual who is not
the owner and who, by virtue of his or her position, can gain possession of valuable items.
An example of embezzlement on a grand scale is when an executive transfers a large sum
of money into a private bank account after falsely claiming for the funds. Embezzlement
can happen where there is a conflict of interest. Whilst bribery and extortion can involve
two or more parties, embezzlement is a single handed act. Fraud is an economic offence
that can deceive others, to gain an unfair or illegal advantage. Examples of fraud include
counterfeiting, illegal trade, forgery and smuggling.23 Conflict of interest is a “situation
where an individual or the entity for which they work, whether a government, business,
media outlet or civil society organization is confronted with choosing between the duties
and demands of their position and their own private interests.24
2.2.2 Challenges of Measuring Corruption
Corruption is a very complex topic. It is often clandestine, illicit and sensitive in nature,
and thus determining a single and appropriate methodology to measure it, is difficult.25
Hard data are often challenging to acquire and, when available, have to be carefully anal-
ysed to avoid false and inaccurate conclusions. It is important to collect data from a wide
variety of sources to obtain an accurate assessment and to remove any possible bias and
potential error.26 The question is how can corruption be measured if it is often concealed
and hidden from the public eye? From the early 2000s, both the public and private sec-
tors have taken significant steps to address corruption.28 Since the 1990s, the number of
available corruption indices that measure corruption have proliferated and some of these
are indicated in Table 2.1. They include the Transparency International Corruption Per-
ception Index (CPI) and the World Bank and Governance Indicator (WBGI). Alternative
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Table 2.1: Measures of Corruption
Index/Survey
Source
Definition of Cor-
ruption measured
Information
Sources
Coverage Interpretation
Corruption Per-
ceptions Index
(CPI)
Perceived corrup-
tion (composite)
and some mea-
sures of corrup-
tion control
Statistical sum-
mary of expert
assessments
(e.g. expatriate
business exec-
utives, senior
business leaders,
assessment by
US, regional, and
incountry experts
)
Almost global
depending on
having sufficient
sources. Annual
(though not all
data sources
annual)
Cross-sectional
ranking of
perception of
corruption focus-
ing on business
environment
Global Corrup-
tion Barometer
(GCB) and re-
lated surveys by
Transparency
International
Bribe payments
by households
and public
perceptions
of corruption
prevalence
Public opinion
surveys and
partial household
surveys
69 countries in
2005, though not
nationally repre-
sentative in many
cases
Comparative
prevalence and
amounts of bribe
payments though
quality of sur-
vey data needs
validation
Bribe Payers In-
dex (BPI)
Perceived will-
ingness of
companies from
different coun-
tries to pay
bribes, and sec-
tors in which
bribery most
prevalent
Business experts 21 countries
based on evi-
dence from main
emerging market
economies. Last
carried out 2002
Ranking of
perceived will-
ingness to pay
bribes in different
countries. Valid-
ity of perceptions
and weighting
uncertain
World Bank En-
terprise Survey
(WBES)
Bribe payments
by firms
Surveys of busi-
nesses
62 countries, var-
ious years
Quantitative
comparisons of
bribe prevalence
and cost
Source: Stephen Jones, “Measuring Corruption. OPM Briefing Notes”, Oxford Policy
Management, 200727
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methods have been introduced to measure the actual experiences of corruption and an
example of these is the Global Barometer Survey (GBS), the only worldwide public opin-
ion survey that measures the perceived views and perceptions on petty corruption.29 The
Afrobarometer, the Latinobarometer and the Eurobarometer are alternative regional in-
struments that have been introduced to measure petty corruption in Africa, Latin America
and Europe, respectively. Their aim is to capture public opinion on democratic and gov-
ernmental issues by collecting data through household surveys. These surveys are useful
tools in assessing the perceived level of petty corruption based on personal experiences.30
The Transparency International CPI was the first instrument introduced to measure cor-
ruption in the 1990s and, today, is widely used by organisations, researchers and aca-
demics worldwide.31 It was originally introduced to measure public sector corruption and
is a composite index that gathers data from organisations that engage with governments
and businesses to capture the perceived level of corruption on a global scale by using
surveys and expert opinions.32 The CPI is conducted on a yearly basis to assess global
public sector corruption and ranks about 200 countries on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0
indicates a high level of corruption and 10 a low level of corruption. It captures infor-
mation via a survey by asking questions related to bribery of public officials, kickbacks
in public procurement and embezzlement of public funds.33 However, it fails to provide
a measurement of the volume of paid bribes, and it does not identify the actual causes of
corruption nor the resulting impact.
The Bribe Payers Index (BPI) is a survey capturing data from the 28 world’s largest
economies, including the G20 countries.34 It collects the views of about 3,000 busi-
ness executives regarding their perceived level of bribery across the business and private
sectors.35 Each country is ranked on scale from 0 to 10, where 10 indicates a bribe-free
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country and 0 a country where bribes are commonly received.36
The World Bank survey collects data through interviews with enterprise owners and se-
nior level managers in large and middle size organisations. It collects firm experiences
from within the business environment and via government processes in relation to infor-
mal payments. The aim of this survey is to capture the percentage of firms that are likely
to engage in bribes in order for them to accomplish a particular task.37
Unfortunately, all these indices can only provide an estimate of corruption and deter-
mining an accurate measure of corruption is an ongoing challenge. The survey strategy
is used to collect data on direct corruption experiences and to assess corruption. Surveys
can be used to target a specific population group and to gather data through individual
responses, interviews and questionnaires. The collected data can be based on an objective
opinion that relates to previous experiences of corruption, or can be subjective and based
on the individual’s views and perceptions of corruption.38 The results of a survey are used
for monitoring and evaluating corruption and can assist in taking corrective measures and
defining new approaches to fight corruption. For a survey to be valid, it is important to
select a suitable representative sample of the population and this is a key aspect of the
research process with respect to data validation.39 For example, a sample of the general
public that is unlikely to have direct experience with the public sector would not be a valid
sample to study corruption in the public sector compared to people who have direct expe-
rience with governmental environments.40 Each method used to measure corruption offer
in different ways some strengths and weaknesses, and these are presented in Table 2.2.
Perception-based indicators are arguably the most common methods used in assessing
corruption. They provide subjective opinions and perceptions from experts and citizens
in a given country.41 Composite indicators, instead, are used to quantify large statistical
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Table 2.2: Strengths and Weakness of Corruption Instruments
Type Strengths Weakness
Global Corrup-
tion Barometer
It is the only worldwide
public opinion survey to
gather public views and
experiences of corruption
GBC offers perceptions of people’s
experience of corruption in various
institutions but fails to assess insti-
tutional framework
Corruption
Perception Index
Measures corruption on
a wide scale The index
uses a large scope of pri-
mary sources Plays a large
role in interest groups,
lobby groups and cam-
paign groups
The CPI does not provide a real
form of measurement It only mea-
sures one form of corruption, which
is public sector corruption
Bribery Payers
Index
The data captured in this
form of measurement is on
the supply side of interna-
tional bribery. It only fo-
cuses on bribery in the pri-
vate sector
BPI does not measure institutional
problems bribery. This index assess
on how often bribes are paid, but
does not provide volume and causes
of bribery
World Bank En-
terprises
This covers a wide variety
of countries and the data
collected is over a large
scale and covers both di-
rect experience and per-
ceptions of corruption
The methods to gather the data have
been modified and the coverage of
the countries have been increased
Source:Adapted by author Sofia Wickberg, “How to Guide for Corruption Assessment
Tools”.43
data in a single data indicator. This is a widely used measure (e.g. the CPI) that captures
corruption from a global perspective that focuses on one particular form of corruption.42
Selecting the correct instrument to measure corruption largely depends on the type of
corruption to be assessed.
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2.2.3 Measuring Corruption: An Empirical View
Due to the nature of the topic, data from real cases of corruption are limited, and, there-
fore, assessments can often only be based on individual perceptions and experiences.
Because studying corruption is a complex task, a clear understanding of the forms of cor-
ruption must be achieved before the phenomenon can be properly analysed. Corruption
needs to be assessed in relation to its extent, place and trends, and all these need to be
carefully taken into account.44 For all these reasons, measuring corruption has become a
controversial subject in the literature and has sparked off a lot of debate on what methods
are reliable and valid. There is a strand of literature that criticises the available methods
to measure corruption.
The CPI, for example, has been criticised by many academics. Thompson argues that
the CPI extracts perceived data rather than real data, because the views expressed in the
CPI index are only based on respondent perceptions of corruption. He argues that corrup-
tion data should be collected using different sources, from a wide variety of backgrounds,
to make the results reliable and unbiased. The CPI does not cover the average citizen
on the street, who could potentially be a victim of illicit behaviour, and instead, opinions
are based on experts. Thompson argues that experts’ perceptions of corruption may be
interpreted differently by other individuals as perceptions depend on previous experience,
and may differ on the basis of class, gender and age.45
Anderson and Heywood argue that the questions posed in many of the CPI surveys re-
late directly to business transactions, with the aim of understanding the nature of bribes
paid in the public sector alone, and the results are largely based on western opinions.
They argue that the CPI fails to identify the types of corruption because, for example,
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it does not distinguish between grand and petty corruption and their effects.46 Shah and
Thompson argue that the CPI index relies on expert assessments of corruption, including
feedback from expatriates, and therefore represents only a very small proportion of the
population. They argue that as a result, this may lead to a poor understanding of corrup-
tion in a particular country. It is difficult to achieve an objective opinion of corruption as
most people hold biased opinions of government.47
2.2.4 Measuring and Understanding corruption at the Firm Level
There is widespread interest in measuring corruption and trying to identify its causes and
consequences. A study carried out by Mauro found that high levels of corruption are often
associated with lower levels of investment and growth and this discourages foreign direct
investment and capital inflows.48 Konold explores the public’s perception of corruption
in Senegal, by using public opinion and survey data from the Afrobarometer. This was
part of a research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, gover-
nance, economic conditions and related issues in more than 35 countries in Africa.49 The
respondents define corruption differently, depending on their individual beliefs. The way
questions were framed allowed the respondents to reply “dont know” and, as a result,
there were observations that could not be captured. It was found that questions based
on direct corruption experiences were not a useful way to engage. The research shows
that individual perceptions were tailored according to the surroundings and that perceived
corruption varied significantly across geographic regions. The author also concluded that
measuring corruption is challenging, due to lack of hard data, and because corruption of-
ten takes place away from the public.50
Since the 1990s, the World Bank has used firm level surveys in various countries to iden-
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tify and provide insights on the causes and consequences of corruption at firm level. As
a result, in recent years, data from firm level surveys have been widely used by schol-
ars, as an individual unit of measure to help researchers explore firms’ experiences with
corruption.51 When collecting firm-level survey data, researchers rely on two important
factors: trust regarding the data received and trust with respect to the firms’ responses.
These surveys may lead to truthful responses, but, at the same time, could also produce
non-random responses to information that are politically sensitive. As a result, the data
obtained could be contentious.52 Politically sensitive research data were investigated by
Jensen by examining non-responses and false responses.53 It was found that individual
responses could be perceived as difficult when they answer sensitive questions. He argues
that it is important for researchers to consider the incentive of firms and the political envi-
ronment when assessing corruption at a firm level because these could alter the responses
to the questions asked. Jensen put forward a number of suggestions to deal with these
issues, including the addition of descriptive statistics on the non-responses to the research
document to show any bias.
The World Bank carried out empirical work in 72 countries and across more than 44,000
firms.54 Results suggest that press freedom plays a vital role on how firms report corrup-
tion, and this can therefore be a significant issue for a country’s economy. This judgment
was also strongly supported by Jensen.55 Press freedom is the ability to express ideas and
opinions freely in a critical manner and without any interference and has an important role
to play in reducing corruption.56 Observations confirm that the lower is the press freedom,
the lower are the firms responses, and the higher is the non-response rate. Jensen confirms
that political governing countries were less likely to understate the level of corruption and
this could potentially lead to an inaccurate assessment of corruption and unsound policy
recommendations. It was also observed that non-responses can be useful to researchers
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that use a firm-level survey technique strategy as they could indicate potential problems.
Non-responses and potential false responses to politically sensitive questions can poten-
tially provide insights on the business environment and on the levels of corruption.
The conclusions of the Policy Research Working Paper confirm that perception data are
easier to obtain than direct data on corrupt deals, recognising that perceptions represent a
challenge.57 It is argued that perceptions are formed by what people think is taking place,
rather than personal experience. When corruption is measured based on perceptions, there
is no indication on what type of corruption is being measured. Perceptions are based on
individual opinions, on what people perceive to be corrupt and this can differ from one
person to another. For example, a person living in a corrupt country may not perceive an
action to be corrupt as it represents accepted behaviour, whilst another individual in an
honest country might hold the opposite view and consider the action to be corrupt. An
individual’s state of mind may affect the responses. Most critics argue that there exists a
gap between perceptions of corruption and actual corruption (real corruption).58
Additional research also concludes that measuring corruption is challenging because of
the lack of hard data.59 The United Nations Development Programme highlights that cor-
ruption can be measured using a variety of approaches, but also recognises it is challeng-
ing to assess large amounts of data, especially when different countries are compared.60
Others argue that the use of aggregate indices, such as the CPI index, are useful to monitor
levels of corruption in a country and to assess real forms of corruption.61
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2.3 Nature and Extent of Corruption
The term globalisation was commonly used in the 1980s to reflect technological ad-
vances that make it easier and quicker to complete both international trade and financial
transactions.62 The scale of international globalisation has dramatically risen since the
1980s, and previous research by the World Bank found that globalisation has led the de-
veloping economies to experience lower poverty and inequality.63
As new companies enter the global market, the level of competition to explore markets
in the emerging economies becomes higher and higher and this makes commercial life
increasingly more challenging. Research conducted by the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund show that some foreign investors pay bribes to officials to win a
contract in emerging economies.64 The OECD also found that bribes are generally paid by
third party agents to win contracts and almost two-thirds of the foreign bribery cases ex-
amined relate to sectors that involve contracts or licensing through public procurement.65
Bribery is one of the most widespread forms of corruption. A survey carried out in 2007
shows that 43% of the respondents believe they failed to win business contracts over the
previous five years due to bribes paid by the industrial competitors.66 A Transparency
International Report claims that managers regularly bribe public officials in order to win
governmental contracts.67 The World’s largest survey, the Global Corruption Barometer
2017 aims to capture citizens’ views and direct personal experiences in bribery in 119
countries. The findings suggest that bribery exists in all countries. The Europeon Union
had a 9% bribery rate whereas the Middle East and North Africa had an average of 30%.
Whilst Latin America, Carribean and Asia Pacific countries had an average of 28%.68
An additional Transparency International Report found that 40% of countries still need to
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improve their performance in international business transactions.69
Table 2.3 shows a selection some of the cases investigated by the Serious Fraud Office
(SFO). The SFO is one of the leading law enforcement organisations overseeing cases of
foreign bribery. Reportedly, since 2006, the UK has had 11 active bribery and corruption
cases, with a further 18 cases under consideration. In total, there have been over 150
cases of international bribery under investigation.70 The SFO is investigating allegations
that relate to fraud, bribery and corruption involving leading UK companies.71 These
allegations relate to irregularities that concern third party consultants. The use of inter-
mediaries calls for stronger and more effective due diligence and oversight of corporate
compliance programmes.72
2.3.1 Public Sector Corruption
Transparency International defines public sector corruption as: “any kind of abuse of
entrusted power for private gain that can take place within a government structure or
government body”. Public sector corruption includes various types of unethical act, such
as bribery, embezzlement and fraud. For example, public officials could be bribed in the
procurement process, while fraud could occur in bid evaluation and when invoices and
contract obligations are processed.79
Transparency and accountability are two important concepts that play a significant role in
contributing to good governance in the public sector. Transparency can be described as
assessing the achievements of a government for the citizens so that the information can be
disclosed to the public. For example, external audit reports should allow for public access
and disclose the company’s financial performance. This allows the public to gain trust in
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Table 2.3: Recent High Profile Foreign and UK national bribery investigations
Date Company Conviction
2014 Rolls-Royce PLC The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) was investigating
alleged corruption cases from 1989 to 2013 with
two entities Rolls-Royce Holdings plc and United
States incorporated subsidiary, Rolls-Royce En-
ergy Systems Inc. The draft indictments include 11
counts covering multiple counts of conspiracy to
corrupt under the pre-Bribery Act legislation, false
accounting, and failure to prevent bribery under
section 7 of the Bribery Act.73 The USA, Brazil
and UK authorities reached a settlement with Rolls
Royce. In January 2017, a Deferred Payment
Agreement was reached and a settlement of 671
million pounds was agreed with Rolls Royce to
settle the allegations.74
2014 Sweett Group The Serious Fraud Office found that from 2012 to
2014 Sweett Group paid bribes estimated to GBP
500 000 to an official of the United Arab Emi-
rates to win a contract valued at GBP 1 500 000.
The company was charged under section 7 of the
Bribery Act and pleaded guilty.
2016 Mondial The investigation agency COLP found that two
former executives of a defence company, paid
an estimated $200,000 to a US official to se-
cure contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq valued at
$5,000,000. Both were charged under the pre-
Bribery Act legislation and prosecuted.75
Ongoing
2016
Airbus Group In April 2016, Airbus reported to the UK export
Finance that it had found inaccuracies in appli-
cations for export support concerning the use of
overseas agents. Airbus has an obligation to report
any falsifying of information to the UKEF authori-
ties. Following this self-disclosure, UKEF referred
this information to the SFO.76 In August 2016, the
SFO is investigating criminal allegations of fraud,
bribery and corruption. The allegations relate to
bribery irregularities of third party agents.77
Source: Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention78
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a company’s services and provides an opportunity to raise any concerns about weak finan-
cial practices and corruption.80 This is a paramount requirement for global businesses. A
key component of good governance is ethics; that is, the set of values and principles which
guide behaviour in business. An ethical framework fosters good governance and integrity
in managing day-to-day business activities. Previous research in 2015 showed that 107
companies show little evidence of anti-corruption programmes and that 37% of the de-
fence companies under scrutiny failed to provide any evidence of such programmes.81
Public sector corruption can be described as a failure in governance. This can be due to
a spectrum of factors that includes the quality of public sector management, the nature of
accountability and transparency activities between the government and the citizens, the
legal framework and the level of transparency of processes and policies. An example of
public sector corruption is when an employee deviates from the legal framework to re-
ceive a gift or a reward, or when information is concealed to seek monetary value.
Figure 2.2: OECD Percentages of Bribes Paid in Public Services
Source: Adapted from “OECD Foreign Bribery Report”, OECD, visited online on 12
December 201782
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Public procurement is often perceived as corrupt and has been on the agenda of many
anti-corruption organisations, such as Transparency International and OECD, in relation
to programmes that develop policies to raise awareness of corruption on a global scale.
The OECD analysed 427 international bribery cases and found that 57% of these involved
bribes paid in public procurement. Figure 2.2 shows the percentages of bribes paid in pub-
lic services. It shows bribes were paid in customs clearance (12%), tax treatment (6%),
receipt of licences (6%), access confidential information (4%) and to travel (1%).83
Public corruption is devastating and has a huge impact on state revenues. In 2004, the
World Bank estimated that about $1 trillion dollars is spent in bribes each year.84 This
loss of public funds, as result of increased expenditure, significantly hampers the eco-
nomic growth of a country,85 and increases distrust of governmental institutions, destroy-
ing public confidence in governmental and public administrative processes. For all these
reasons, global corruption in the public sector requires more attention.86 The 2016 Trans-
parency International CPI Report indicates that public sector corruption is perceived as a
global issue that needs to be addressed. It was found that corruption levels are perceived
to be higher in countries that suffer poor functioning of public services, such as poor
policing and judicial services. It also found that the existing laws are often violated and
legal procedures undermined, particularly in countries belonging to Asia, the Middle-East
and Africa. On the other hand, countries with robust monitoring procedures are perceived
to have lower levels of corruption in the public sector.
Fraud and bribery are arguably a problematic feature of public procurement. The Na-
tional Fraud Authority (NFA) estimates that approximately £2.3 billion is annually lost
due to procurement fraud in the UK public sector.87 So, how big is the problem? The
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Department for International Development (DFID) carried out investigations of allega-
tions of fraud. The fraud team received a total of 429 allegations between 2015 and 2016
(see Figure 2.3).88 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) found that, between
2015 and 2016, most fraud cases occurred on foreign soil, whilst only a small percentage
of bribes involved staff in the UK. Most of the fraud that occurred internally involved
only a few departments covering contracts and procurement (13%) (see Figure 2.3). A
large number of fraud cases occur in countries with high levels of conflict and with frag-
ile governments, including Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria and the Democratic Republic of
Congo.89 These are countries identified by the 2016 TI CPI index as suffering the most
severe levels of corruption.90
Figure 2.3: Fraud Allegations between 2015 and 2016
Source: National Audit Office Report Department for International Development,
Investigation into the Departments approach to tackling fraud91
Impact of bribery
Bribes are a common form of corruption that occur both in the private sector and in local
government. In 2016, the Institute of Business Ethics (IBE) claimed that the most prob-
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lematical business ethics issues were bribery, fraud and money laundering.92 The 2011
Transparency International Bribery Index ranked 28 leading international and regional
exporting countries in terms of the likelihood of their firms to bribe abroad. The results
indicated that Russia and China were perceived as the countries most likely to pay bribes
abroad, whilst the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK were perceived as the least likely
to do so. The overall results indicate that bribes were perceived as common across all
sectors, with public works, contracts and construction sectors being perceived as the most
corrupt.93 Bribes were most often paid to low-level public officials: for example, to speed
the delivery of an administrative process.
The impact of bribery on an organisation can be harmful. A study conducted by the
Harvard Business School analyses the impact of bribery on corporate performance.94 The
aim of the study was to determine how bribery impacts on firms’ operations across four
areas: external business relations; interactions with regulators; public reputation; and the
morale of employees. The outcome of the investigation shows that the morale of em-
ployees drops when organisations use bribery to gain success, and this also negatively
impacts on reputation and stock market return. Other data from a survey were assessed
by Pricewaterhouse Coopers, an organisation that advises services firms on legal issues.
The analysis of this data, collected from 2009 to 2011, found that 10% of respondents
(from a total of about 500) had reported that their firm was involved in bribery cases.
Many of the respondents worked for companies with a reputation for bribery in countries
like Russia, Ukraine and South Africa. In addition, the findings reveal that other countries
such as Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States are involved in bribery but
to a much lesser degree as compared to other countries.95
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2.4 Combating the ‘cancer of corruption’
In a speech, former President, James David Wolfensohn, of the World Bank, stated:
“If the new compact is to succeed, we must tackle the issue of economic and
financial efficiency. But we also need to address transparency, accountability,
and institutional capacity. And let’s not mince words, we need to deal with
the cancer of corruption”.96
This speech highlights that corruption is an economic danger and that transparency, ac-
countability and the ability to strengthen processes and resources of organizations are all
areas of significant concern.
Over the years, there has been a proliferation of global anti-corruption initiatives aimed
at influencing individuals to carry out their duties in an ethical manner with the aim of
discouraging illegal acts, such as bribery, embezzlement, fraud, conflict of interest and
extortion. Conventions and regulatory frameworks have emerged, both nationally and
internationally, to provide guidelines for governments, organisations, companies, stake-
holders, contractors and officials to comply with the domestic and international laws and
to promote good governance and eliminate risks of harm. Failure to comply with these
regulatory laws could result in prosecution of offenders and fines against businesses. The
UK Bribery Act is the legal initiative, launched in 2010, that the UK applies to all UK
companies and to foreign companies that engage in business with the UK. Failure to com-
ply with the UK Bribery Act results in significant implications, such as the payment of
penalties. The UK Act places very strict requirements on all companies that operate in
the UK, as well as stricter provisions on compliance.97 The OECD Convention came into
force in 1999 with the primary aim to criminalise international foreign bribery in business
transactions. The convention includes 41 countries and introduced legislation to crimi-
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nalise the act of bribing foreign public officials.98 The Anti-Bribery Convention was the
first legal international anti-corruption initiative to focus on the supply chain of foreign
bribery.99 In 1977, the United States became the first country to criminalise payments of
bribes to US citizens representing companies and foreign government officials. The law
was heralded as an important and necessary measure to restore public confidence in the
country.
2.4.1 Causes and Consequences of Corruption
As previously discussed, corruption can have a devastating impact on the economy and
stability of a country. Mauro confirms that corruption has a direct impact on the economy
and affects both growth and development.100 Countries with high levels of corruption
have lower levels of investment and slower economic growth. The global challenge in
reducing the cost of corruption is complex. The World Bank shows that over $1 trillion
is paid in bribes each year.101 The causes of corruption are influenced by a number of
factors. Corrupt activities are generally associated with government and public officials,
as they play a lead role in using their discretionary power to influence decisions and
outcomes. In developing countries, corruption is perceived to be endemic due to the
lack of institutional governance. For example, public officials have the power to issue
permits, licenses and passports. Often the processing times to obtain these documents
is lengthy, but a bribe can be paid to an officer to speed up the process. This results in
abuse of public power for personal gain.102 There are a number of systematic features
that have been identified that can encourage corruption. These are weak institutions, lack
of accountability and transparency and lack of democracy. Weak institutions can foster
corruption. They generally lack the control and monitoring systems to prevent it, thus
creating a conducive environment for illicit practices. Corruption can thrive in conditions
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where there is a general lack of accountability and transparency. Countries that lack
democracy, experience high levels of corruption and this often results in a lack of trust in
the government and a weak democratic system.
2.4.2 Correlation between Defence and Corruption
Corruption poses a significant problem in the defence sector, and allegations of corruption
in this sector are commonplace. SIPRI reports that 40% of corruption occurs in foreign
transactions involving arms deals.103 Defence contracts are often drawn up under secretive
conditions, and this makes the defence contracting process vulnerable to corrupt activities.
Defence projects are capital intensive, and thus bribes can potentially be hidden in the
contract. The lack of transparency and the secretive nature of arms deals can exacerbate
the risks of corruption. Governments invariably play an instrumental role in purchasing
arms. In 1985, the UK and the Saudi governments signed the government-to-government
Al Yammah contract. A slush fund was used to entertain Saudi officials, and to offer
holidays, fleets of sports cars, shopping and lavish holidays. Allegedly, £6 billion was paid
in corrupt commissions through a network of agents and middlemen.104 These serious
allegations of corruption were the consequence of ineffective oversight, transparency and
accountability. Defence firms are not always required to provide full transparency of their
defence spending on national security grounds, and hence are potentially able to engage
in misconduct. The secrecy that surrounds defence deals allows firms to create barriers to
transparent oversight, leading to potentially corrupt practices. Offset is an inherent feature
in defence contracts and has become very controversial. Such parallel arrangements have
sparked a wave of concern in defence deals.105
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2.5 The Research Gap: is offset tainted by corruption?
An offset ‘agreement’ is an attachment to the primary defence deal, and may influence the
ability to secure large overseas deals. Corruption in the arms trade has attracted consider-
able interest with the media. A 2010 Transparency International Report raised awareness
of (alleged) corruption in defence offset. The Report was highly critical of offset, high-
lighting the most controversial cases, one them been the infamous South African arms
deal. The 1999 South African arms deal has generated massive attention over the high
volume of allegations of corruption in procurement and offset. As part of the offset
deal, it was promised that 65,000 jobs would be generated in South Africa, providing
employment opportunities that would create R104 billion in economic activity, each job
estimated to have cost £107,000.106 In 2010, the South African Department of Industry
and Trade (DIT) confirmed that only 28,000 direct jobs had been created as a result of the
offset arrangement.107 The exact nature of corruption in offset remains unconfirmed in
the South African arms deal. For example, the Swedish firm Saab had arranged to invest
in the South African tourism industry. As part of the investment, Saab claimed $3,383 in
credits for every Scandinavian visitor from 2001 until 2011.108 Saab was receiving mil-
lions of dollars in offset credits for a paltry investment estimated at $3m. Holden argues
that the nature of corruption in offset is hard to evaluate and measure, and suggests that
the tendering process had been manipulated and allegedly tainted by corruption, leading
to lack of transparency in the offset credit system and employment opportunities. The
biggest challenges in offset is the lack of transparency and the complexities exacerbated
by secrecy.
Defence offset has attracted criticism in recent years mainly due to the lack of data
and hence debate on the existence of corruption in offset. Few empirical studies have
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been carried out into corruption in offset. Peter Platzgummer conducted a comprehensive
quantitative analysis into corruption in offset. He cited over 20 articles on alleged corrup-
tion, but found no examples to prove it had occurred. He argues that corruption occurs
in procurement,109 especially in the pre-contract phase, with bribes used as incentives to
favour potential suppliers. In the South African case, allegedly high ranking officials were
bribed by prominent suppliers to influence key decisions in the deal. The SFO documents
state that “between 2000 and 2005, South African agents allegedly received over £70
million through BAES offshore marketing accounts”.110 In a separate Portuguese case,
allegations were also made of corruption in offset. The corruption allegations centred on
Portugal’s 2004 submarine purchase by a German company Ferrostaal and Thyssen.111
Two investigations were begun: one was an inquiry into allegations of bribery in the main
deal, and the second focused on the offset programme. Suspicions centred on the integrity
of the offsets programme. According to a report, a number of problems occurred in the
implementation of the offset.112 There was forgery, but this related to a lack of trans-
parency in the management of the acquisition process leading to a failure in the offset
project.113 By 2012, offset was supposed to have been completed but by 2010 only 25%
had been executed.114 In Germany, in December 2011, two former Ferrostaal managers
were charged with bribery and corruption, involving Portuguese and Greek officials. Ju-
dicial prosecutions are still underway regarding the purchase of two submarines for the
Portuguese Navy and related offsets.115
Corruption in offset remains a grey area in defence contracts, as it is difficult to ascer-
tain where the corruption occurs. The 2010 Transparency International Report highlights
the possible pathways of corruption in offset, but fails to provide solid evidence. All the
alleged cases mentioned in the report are based on allegations of corruption and none
have been proven. Most of the cases listed in the TI report reflect irregularities in the
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arms-procurement process and failure of offset promises; however, as identified earlier,
the main implications have been made against the lack of transparency in defence pro-
curement. Although there has been a lot of speculation and public scrutiny over the use
of offset, the evidence on corruption in offset is sparse, and certainly there is no evidence
to prove that corruption is endemic. There is a need to carry out further work to con-
firm the extent of corruption in offset. So the question remains, does corruption exist
in offset programmes? This study employs the case study of the UK, and explores the
ethical framework of three major defence suppliers. Due to the sensitive nature of the
study, the principal focus will be on the ethical framework, with a sub-focus on offset.
The motivation behind this research is to provide national governments, companies and
international bodies with information on the causes of corruption in defence. A set of pol-
icy recommendations will be suggested to improve the ethical frameworks to curb global
corruption.
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Chapter 3
Weird and Wonderful World of Offset
3.1 Introduction
The Government of accountability: Frank Conahan in 1985 stated that offset has become
a “fact of life in international trade and is likely to continue to be”.1
Offset has become an important facet of the international arms trade. It is not restricted to
the arms industry, but is also used in other industries, such as power generation, telecom-
munications and infrastructure projects.2 The word “offset” for the arms exports industry
has become synonymous with economic growth, opportunity, and in investment, induce-
ment, cost-efficiency, access to new markets and the list can go on. Purchasing countries
see offset as an opportunity to drive growth, development and investment into the local
economy. Offset has become particularly valuable for emerging countries, such as South
Africa, the UAE, Brazil and India.
Researchers for Transparency International and the researcher Platzgummer have criti-
cised offset claiming, that it is a fertile ground for corruption due to its sensitive nature
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and the lack of transparency. Such claims have sparked off allegations of bribery and
corruption.3 Although offset is widely practiced, some nations, including the USA, con-
sider offset agreements to be “market-distorting and inefficient”.4 Despite criticism, offset
is commonly used in the defence industry, and more than 130 countries worldwide have
offset guidelines.5
The arms trade has, indeed, become an attractive market, and millions of dollars are
spent on defence contracts, as well as the parallel deals called “offset”. Offset indeed
is a thriving in foreign markets. A leading defence consulting firm called Avascent stated
that cumulative global offset obligations had reached $500 billion by 2016.6 Offset are
big ticket deals for many countries. The military offset obligations are expected to in-
crease from $36.36 billion in 2012 to $49.61 billion in 2021.7 The economic importance
of international defence offset is growing and will continue to grow in the near future.
In order to gain a better understanding of offset, it is important to consider its impact on
global defence markets.
3.1.1 Offset Evolution
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in major changes and restructuring of the
economic and political spheres including the international defence sector.8 With the end
of the cold war, global military budgets shrank significantly as a result the drop in defence
expenditure by member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
former members of the Warsaw Pact .
In recent years, however, global military spending has increased. A first spike was
prompted by the 9/11 attack in 2001, which ultimately led to the wars with Iraq and
74
with Afghanistan.9 In 2016, world military expenditure rose to $1,686 billion, equivalent
to an increase of 0.4% compared to 2015.10
Today, conflict is rife. Regions experiencing conflict are Africa, Syria, Gaza, Iraq and
other countries in the Middle East. The wars in the Islamic states continue and crises
remain unresolved. International terrorists have proved that they are capable of striking
anywhere to destabilize the traditional patterns of international security.11
As a result of the global tension and increased conflict and terrorism in the Middle East,
the supplier arms industry is under tremendous pressure. There is high demand in the de-
fence market, making it an attractive business for foreign governments to purchase state-
of-the-art weapons. A 2016 report lists the top countries in the military spending and
these are shown in Table 3.1. The United States is leading in the world military spending
with $611 billion.12 China is the second biggest spender, accounting for $215 billion, fol-
lowed by Russia ($92.2 billion) and Saudi Arabia with $63.7 billion.13 The UK is sixth,
with $48.3 billion, followed by Japan, Germany, South Korea and Italy.14 Defence pro-
curement can take different forms that include indigenous projects, shared technology,
development and production, licensed production and off-the-shelf purchases of a foreign
product.16 The demand for indigenous arms is increasing both in the national and interna-
tional markets. Predictions identify the GCC countries as the lead markets with a potential
defence expenditure of $1 trillion between 2013 and 2025.17 Saudi Arabia is expected to
generate $62.63 billion by 2021 in offset obligations.18 Countries require state-of-the-art
weapons and ideally the expertise and technology to produce them to avoid outsourcing
to offshore markets due to lack of expertise and defence capabilities.
After 9/11, the arms trade became more international, as a result of increased pressure
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Table 3.1: Top 15 Countries’ Military Expenditure 2016
Source: SIPRI Online Factsheet April 2016 Trends Military Expenditure 2016, Nan
Tian, Aude Fleurant, Pieter Wezeman and Siemon Wezeman15
from buyers and sellers, leading to a significant liberalisation of trade. Despite the de-
cline in Europe, the arms trade was sustained by the rest of the world. Weapons were
still procured and this led to a globalized industry. The arms trade became a competitive
environment, shifting from a seller’s market to a buyer’s market. In order for companies
to survive in such a competitive arms market, offset became integrally linked to the main
defence contract, allowing businesses to make virtually irresistible offers with promises
of lucrative, ‘add-ons’ called offsets.19
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The evolution of offset began in the 1970s with a consortium of four NATO European
countries, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands and Norway looking to buy a replacement
combat aircraft.20 This created a competitive environment between defence suppliers,
facing high intensity market pressure.21 Bespoke packages were custom-made to meet
the specific requirements of buyers, and these included technology transfer, licenced pro-
duction, co-production and research and development.
Today, offset is a big commercially sensitive business.22 Countries are demanding off-
set obligations in varying degrees. For example, Brazil typically requires 100% offset
obligations, South Africa 50% and South Korea 30%.23 So why do governments pursue
offset? Offset is used by governments to partially justify their purchases of arms by high-
lighting the benefits accruing to the national economy through technology transfer and
buy-back. They also use offset as a means to extract rent and achieve multiple objec-
tives: for example, getting the best value for money through added benefits attached to
the arms deal. These benefits can include acquiring new technology transfer, accessing
new markets, supporting key industries and promoting strategic alliances with multina-
tional companies.24
Offset is an essential feature and a highly competitive feature of the global defence market
as evidenced by an Airbus statement specifying that “offset requirements are becoming
more demanding and increasingly difficult to fulfill, particularly in light of low cost emerg-
ing country approaches”.25
In order to gain a better understanding of offset, it is important to consider the impact
of offset in the global markets.
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3.1.2 Global Proliferation of Offset
Each country has developed niches and strategies to develop defence capabilities via off-
set programmes. In the Middle East, offset is maturing.26 The UAE’s main objectives in
acquiring offset programmes is to develop the economy in diverse areas by reducing its
dependency on oil and seeking opportunities in fields such as health care services, solar
energy and ship-building. This has led the emergence of new markets ventures in UAE
industrial sectors that include shipping, aircraft leasing, fish farming, healthcare, agri-
culture, banking and education.27 Saudi Arabia has since the 1990s enjoyed the benefits
from multi-million dollar joint offset programmes.28 Countries like Brazil, India and In-
donesia use offset programmes to drive regional power ambitions by seeking investment
in technology transfer to provide indigenous weapons.29 In the case of South Korea, the
government motives are aimed at developing a domestic production capability in all sys-
tems areas, and becoming self-sufficient in the manufacturing of arms domestically.30
The European nations have been able to generate more offset than other nations. During
the period 1993-2004, European countries were able to obtain offset valued at 99.1% of
their defence imports, while non-European countries could only achieve 46.6%.31 Some
72.9% of the offset obtained by European nations exceeded 100% of the value of the
weapon systems imported over 1993-2004.32 Further to this, a study carried out by the
EDA on offset showed that Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands depended on indirect off-
set, whilst Spain, Finland, Portugal, Greece and Poland preferred direct offset. EDA also
estimates that the direct offset value was 40% of the total offset in Europe and that indirect
offset contributed 35%.33
US firms account for 55% of the arms global market.34 In 2016, BIS reported that nine-
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teen US firms entered into 651 offset transactions with 26 countries.35 The net value of
these transactions accounted to $5 billion in 2015 with total credit value of $5.3 billion.36
These offset transactions involved purchases, technology transfer and subcontracting.37
Despite this, huge level of activity, the growing demand for offset has created a challeng-
ing environment for defence companies that have to fulfill offset obligations. Blenheim
Capital, a leading provider of offset, reported that there are currently more than $100 bil-
lion offset obligations outstanding globally and that in the next five years another $150
billion obligations are expected to be generated.38
Offset is an aggressive market, and the demands placed on defence companies are rapidly
increasing. The World’s leading defence manufacturers such as the US companies. Boe-
ing, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon have total
offset obligations up until 2022 of $42 million.39 The expected obligations for Lockheed
Martin will generate a total of $23,709 million as indicated in Figure 3.1, and European
Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS) is expected to incur $6.27 million off-
set liabilities.40
The next section is dedicated to a definitional explanation of the offset phenomenon.
The information provided will explain the context of offset by describing its key char-
acteristics. It will also aim to offer a perspective on the offset regulatory frameworks and
policies.
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Figure 3.1: Offset Obligations of Top Ten Global Defence Companies, until 2022
Source: Aircraft Industry Study 2014, The Dwight Eisenhower School for National
Security and Resource Strategy, National Defense University, visited online on 9
December 201741
3.2 Definitions and Context
3.2.1 What is Offset?
The US Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations de-
fine offset as “compensatory obligations which are acquired as a condition of purchase
in either government to government commercial sales of defence articles or defence
services”.42 The word obligation implies offset is not a voluntary compensation but a
mandated option, which is a requirement via a condition to purchase. Offset is interpreted
across nations indicating that there is no universally agreed definition. For example, in
the UK, offset was known as Industrial Participation Policy, South Africa uses the term
National Industrial Policy and in Canada it uses the term Industrial Regional Policy. In-
dustrial policy can be best described as a set of government interventions, which seek
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to support or develop specific industries. These can include manufacturing, IT, research
and development and other areas that stimulate growth and development. They may in-
clude the development of infant industries in the hope that through government assistance,
countries can become internationally competitive.43
Academics and experts have attempted to define the term offset and the prevailing def-
initions are as follows:“Offsets are simply goods and services which form elements and
services of complex voluntary transactions negotiated between governments as purchases
and foreign suppliers. They are those goods and services on which a government chooses
to place the label offset”.44
The words “goods” and “services” can refer to the exchange of goods and services in
the form of monetary value or in the form of credits. This can often involve a wide range
of activities outside the scope of the contractual agreement making the process fairly flex-
ible, complex and vulnerable. The voluntary term suggests that the offset obligation is
never forced by the purchasing country and making the offset arrangement optional for
the buyer. However, in reality, offset is a condition imposed by the buyer on the defence
vendor.
A more precise definition is offered by the US Department of Commerce Bureau of In-
dustry and Security for which:
“An offset transaction directly related to the article(s) or service(s) exported
or to be exported pursuant to the military export sales agreement”.45
Matthews offered a definition that describes offset as:
“either direct or indirect to the primary defence contract the former being
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where the offsetting investment creates ‘defense’ production capacity, often
involving technology transfer, whilst the latter has regard to investment into
the civil sectors of the buyer government’s host economy”.46
Based on the academic literature, definitions vary, but all definitions share a common
view and relate to offset as a “condition of the sale” which makes offset involuntary. In
its simplest form, offset can be described as a reciprocal arrangement between the for-
eign supplier and the purchasing country in which governments may oblige the foreign
supplier to invest a percentage of the contract in the investing country in order to gain
economic reward. The obligations placed by the purchasing government can be in the
form of a specific project rather than a measured amount of the main contract.47
Offset deals are seen as important commercial instruments in emerging markets. Firstly,
emerging markets do not have the required skill base and infrastructure to develop aerospace
and defence technologies.48 For example, Asia and the Middle East require offset for a
number of purposes including increasing domestic employment, obtaining the desired
technology and promoting industrial sectors. Brazil, India, Turkey and South Korea have
an interest in technology transfer in order to acquire the expertise to manufacture arms
and have access to global supply chains in order to perform better internationally, and
have access to the global markets.
The classification of these reciprocal benefits is shown in Figure 3.2.49 Offset contracts
can encompass a wide variety of compensatory arrangements which can be required by
foreign governments. For example, offset can include co-production, licensed production,
buyback, technology transfer, investments and training.50 The type of offset required by
a purchasing country is dependent on its economic goals. A company’s offset obligation
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Figure 3.2: Offset Taxonomy
Source: Adapted by Ron Matthews “Lecture MBA Defence Economics The Arms
Market” Cranfield University, Bedford, 30th June 2017.
is normally worth between 50% and 100% of the value of the main purchasing contract
and can be direct or indirect. These arrangements can fall into two distinct categories,
characterised as direct offset and indirect offset.
3.2.2 Indirect Offset
Indirect offset relates to goods and services that are unrelated to the main defence contract.51
These transactions take place when a foreign supplier creates commercial investment op-
portunities for the purchasing country. They can take the form of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI) and other mediums, such as investment, training, financing activities, mar-
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keting, exporting assistance and technology transfer.52 The use of indirect offset provides
the buying country with leverage for economic development, which can be potentially be
generated by the offset programme to create a longer and sustainable environment. Indi-
rect offset is a common requirement linked to military exports and is perceived to have
attractive benefits for the emerging economies. In the United Arab Emirates, for exam-
ple, indirect offset is more valuable as it reduces the degree of economic dependency on
the oil industry by requiring vendors to invest in industries such as IT, healthcare and
other sectors.53 Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have also adopted a pragmatic approach, and
use indirect offset as a conduit for investment into the local economy.
3.2.3 Direct Offset
Direct offset is a contractual agreement that can include goods and services which are
directly related to the purchasing contract. These goods and services can either take the
form of co-production, license production, buy back, technology transfer and financing
activities (see Table 3.2). The purchasing country may oblige the vendor to manufacture
part of the equipment in the procuring country and transfer technology to train the local
workers on how to operate the equipment.54 Direct offset is commonly used in countries
like Australia, United Kingdom, Brazil, and Turkey. Turkey is a major purchaser of arms
equipment from Western firms in order to strengthen its military capability.55 In Turkey,
direct offset is used to create exports, employment, skills, technology transfer and train-
ing. Co-Production refers to transactions that involve government-to-government agree-
ments. For example, the US government permits the transfer of technology to allow
foreign companies to manufacture all or part of US-origin defence articles.57 Licensed
production is a direct commercial arrangement that can take place between the supplier
and the buyer. This is when the purchaser obtains a share of the production work that
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Table 3.2: Offset Terminology.
Co-
production
Transactions that are based upon government-to-government agree-
ments authorizing the transfer of technology to permit foreign com-
panies to manufacture all or part of US-origin defence articles. Such
transactions are based upon an agreement specifically referenced in For-
eign Military Sales (FMS) Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) and
a government-to-government Memorandums of Understanding (MOU).
Co-production is always classified as a direct offset.
Licenced
Produc-
tion
Overseas production of a U.S.-origin defense article based upon the
transfer of technical information under direct commercial arrangements
between the U.S. manufacturer and the foreign government or producer.
Licensed production is not pursuant to a co-production government-to-
government MOU. In addition, licensed production almost always in-
volves a part or component for a defence system, rather than a complete
defense system. Licensed production transactions can be either direct
or indirect offset.
Technology
Transfer
Transfer of technology that occurs as a result of an offset agreement and
that may take the form of research and development conducted abroad,
technical assistance provided to the subsidiary or joint venture of over-
seas investment, or other activities under direct commercial arrange-
ment between the defence prime contractor and a foreign entity.
Investment Investment arising from an offset agreement, often taking the form of
capital dedicated to the establishment of a foreign entity unrelated to the
defense sale or to expanding the U.S. firms subsidiary or joint venture
in the foreign country. Investment can be either direct or indirect.
Training Generally includes training related to the production or maintenance
of the exported defence item. Training, which can be either direct or
indirect, may be required in unrelated areas, such as computer training,
foreign language skills or engineering capabilities.
Credit As-
sistance
Credit assistance includes direct loans, brokered loans, loan guarantees,
assistance in achieving favourable payment terms, credit extensions,
and lower interest rates. Credit assistance specifically excludes the use
of banked offset credits (credits that exceed the requirement of the off-
set agreement and are permitted, by the terms of the agreement, to be
applied to future offset obligation). Credit assistance is nearly always
classified as an indirect offset transaction but can also be direct.
Source: “Offset Definitions”, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), visited online 20
November 201756
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occurs place in the supplier country. The manufacture of the articles needs to be granted
by the vendor. For example, parts purchased by the vendor can be manufactured in the
purchasing country. The contractual arrangement will include the design and technical
expertise of the engineers to manufacture the components. These direct commercial ar-
rangements can also be referred to as licensed manufacturing agreements or technology
transfer agreements. Most of the largest arms importers, such as Turkey, South Korea and
India are particularly keen in acquiring licence production.58 Buy-Back is when a firm
agrees to purchase products from the importer beyond the agreed amount. For example,
the exporter may transfer the technology and will agree to purchase a proportion of usu-
ally equipment-related items from that firm.59 In direct offset purchases there are also a
variety of other arrangements that can take place within the contract, as indicated in Table
3.2, which include technology transfer, investment, training and credit assistance.
3.2.4 Nature and Objectives of offset
There are a number of reasons why offset is used by governments and suppliers. Offset
plays an important role for governments. It is perceived to be cheaper than off-the-shelf
purchases (though in reality this is not the case) and hence governments can use it to jus-
tify expenditure. Governments may also seek offset to acquire the technological know-
how to promote the country’s defence development. Moreover, governments use offset
policy as a way to extract rent and achieve multiple objectives.60
However, is offset economically viable? This is a difficult question, and most academics
find it challenging to answer due to the complex and hidden nature of offset.61 It is often
difficult to establish who really benefits from offset programmes.62 The South African
(SA) arms deal was an example of offset failure. The South African government agreed a
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Rands 29.9 billion South African arms deal acquisition programme for its armed forces.63
The deal was expected to generate economic benefits to the local economy, including the
creation of 65,000 jobs over a period of seven years, leading to growth and investment
in the South African defence industry.64 This ambitious arms deal was worth Rands 104
billion and included high-tech purchases of corvettes, helicopters and submarines from
Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK. The result of the arms deal could have led to a pos-
itive effect on the South African (SA) economy. However, the overall economic benefits
of the programme remains unclear, though likely far lower than anticipated.
Offset programmes are seen as lucrative investments for a country’s economic and indus-
trial base. However, recent trends indicate that indirect offset is becoming more preva-
lent in the developing economies.65 This type of offset is likely to provide the goods,
technology and research and development, training skills that can enhance the produc-
tive capabilities of the country’s industrial infancy base, and be utilised for future use.
In particular, technology transfer is considered as important for the emerging industries
as it provides the skills to manufacture defence related articles. Moreover, the use of
indirect offset by the importing country creates stronger leverage for economic develop-
ment, which in turn creates a longer and sustainable production runs, not just a one-off
transactions.66 For example, in Saudi Arabia, offset programmes are regarded as key in-
struments to drive economic growth and investment in the economy. The main objective
for the Saudi government is to create private sector business projects and mutually joint
beneficial partnerships with foreign entities.67 A key factor has been technology transfer
to enhance defence capabilities. Technology transfer is a key offset objective for many
other countries. For example, South Korea and Japan have secured the transfer of impor-
tant technologies from the US under offset agreements, enabling them to develop their
own defence self-sufficiency. Governments seek to transfer new technology into the do-
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mestic economy. The transfer of technology has two major incentives: one is to stimulate
growth and the other is to drive investment in the local economy. Moreover, acquiring
new technology skills is seen as an opportunity for buying into new markets that have
been difficult to access.
3.3 Legal Norms of Offset
In order for purchasing governments to procure contracts, there are often contract restric-
tions imposed by the government to which buying countries need to abide. Such practices
are legal norms. All export countries are mandated to follow these requirements that dic-
tate the trade practices in the purchases of arms. However, prescriptive offset policies
have been frowned upon by the advanced countries.
3.3.1 US Perspective on Offset
The United States (US) perceive offset negatively and thus adopts a hands-off approach
in such transactions. The US government recognises offset to be economically inefficient
and trade distorting and forbids governmental agencies entering into any offset arrange-
ment with US firms in the sale of defence goods and services to foreign governments.68
This opposing view of offset is based on the judgment that parts manufactured abroad
result in jobs losses for the US. The second concern is that if technology transfer occurs,
it will erode the US military industrial base because it increases competition from foreign
contractors.69 Therefore, the government encourages buyers to source weapons domes-
tically and limits the use of foreign products. Common judgments are also shared with
the European Defence Agency (EDA) and World Trade Organization (WTO) both hold
conflicting views on offset trade practices.
88
3.3.2 Europe and Offset: End of an Era?
European governments have used offset to promote industries within the defense indus-
trial base. The European Defence Agency (EDA) was established in 2004, with the main
aim of providing support to European Member States (EU) in improving the robustness
of defence capabilities. In July 2004, the implementation of the code of conduct was
launched, seeking the 26 member states to participate in the programme on a voluntary
basis,1 to participate in the programme with the exception of Romania.70 All participating
countries are required by the EDA to publish their offset policies and practices.
All EDA member countries should provide information on offset obligations. The pur-
pose of this regime was to raise transparency and accountability in offset programmes
among member nations, and evolve a free market in defence trade across the EU.71 The
code of conduct is a non-binding, and a voluntary code that applies to all states. The
intended aim of the Directive is to evolve a free market in defence trade. The EDA code
is the first legal instrument in addressing offset practices directly. Member states need to
protect their national security by keeping information discreet when purchasing arms and
should not go beyond the limits of what is necessary. The EU holds a negative view on
offset practices, considering them to be an illegal practice that violates the principles of
primary EU law.
3.3.3 The World Trade Organization (WTO)
The WTO deals with the regulation of trade between participating countries, and govern-
ments to ensure they comply with the rules and policies governing the trading of goods
1EDA member states include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and Norway
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and services. The WTO is made up of 160 members which covers about 95% of world
trade.72 Emerging countries play an important role in the WTO. The organisation en-
sures that developing countries are provided with special attention and ensures that their
best interests are taken into account in relation to trade with other countries. The Gov-
ernment Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the WTO establishes a framework of rights
and requirements that each signatory must embed into its local laws, regulations, proce-
dures and practices for public procurement. The agreements include numerous provisions
giving developing and least developed countries “special and different treatment”.73 The
WTO shares similar views as the European Defence Agency and the US Government re-
garding offset. The WTO forbids the use of offset in government procurement but has
placed an exception on developing countries.74 The main objectives of this important le-
gal framework is to safeguard developing countries’ balance of payments, ensuring that
they have adequate reserves. It also promotes the development of domestic industries
in areas such as licensed technology, investment requirements, counter-trade and similar
requirements.75 The rationale behind this legal initiative is to enhance activities that are
in their infancy stage.
A second set of exemptions is based on the grounds of national security. Defence pur-
chases can range from small arms purchases to radars and weapons systems worth bil-
lions of pounds. Therefore, countries need to ensure that their national security interest is
protected when procuring weapons systems.
3.3.4 Offset Policy Spectrum
The practice of using offset policies first started in the industrialised countries in the
1950s.76 Since then offset has proliferated and polices have become a feature of countries
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using offset programmes. Offset is attractive to many advanced countries and economies,
motivating them to set national policies in the use of defence offset. These offset policies
have been embedded in the form of a policy and goals determined according to the indus-
trial and economic infrastructure needs of a particular country.
Offset policy has been a challenge in some countries, such as India. India is one of
the world’s largest arms importers and has regularly revised its defence offset policy. The
latest policy was introduced in 2016 and superseded the 2013 defence policy. According
to The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) the objective of the Defence Offset Pol-
icy is to create a leverage by acquiring capital acquisitions. To main initiatives of this
policy was to develop the defence industry creating capacity for research, design and de-
velopment relating to defence products and services. The second aim was to encourage
development in sectors like civil aerospace and internal security.77
Offset policy is complex. Steve Schooner states that “there is currently broad consen-
sus on issues such as the need for transparency, integrity, and accountability in defence
procurement”. Yet on the offset issues, consensus is a long way off. There is no agree-
ment internationally and countries are nowhere near reaching a general policy in offset.78
Further to this, there is no defined offset policy or international regulation governing pro-
curement contracts in the defence or civil sectors and therefore no single offset guideline.
Countries often use different strategies to deal with offset programmes based on eco-
nomic and industrial needs. For example, France has focuses on prioritising key sectors
through clear national and sector level visions. Finland focuses attention on the ICT sec-
tor. Singapore uses a direct government intervention approach to promote growth. Korea
and Taiwan have been focused on export objectives.
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Figure 3.3: Offset Policy Spectrum
Source: Adapted from Ron Matthews and Irfan Ansari, “Economic Orthodoxy v Market
Pragmatism: A Case Study of Europe’s Abandonment of Defence Offset”, Public
Finance and Management, Southern Public Administration Education Foundation, vol.
15, no 4, pp.378-404, 2015.80
Due to the nature of offset, there is no “one size fits all approach” and therefore the com-
plexity of the process is couched within the policy. Some countries have a case-by-case
approach, others a ‘best endeavours’ model and still others an obligatory approach. This
is best demonstrated in Matthews’ policy spectrum model in Figure 3.3 which captures
all the main policy approaches.79 The national offset policy spectrum ranges from a flex-
ible case-by-case approach to a mandatory approach. A number of countries started with
one strategy and over time and experience have used different approaches to suit their
economic objectives. The first approach is the case to case approach which allows for
more flexibility. The strength of this approach lies in its adaptability to the complexity of
acquisition technology, contract negotiation and compromise. It is, for example, a model
used in Japan and Singapore.81
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The second policy approach is best endeavours, which was favoured by the British and
Australian governments. In the UK, it incorporated three essential characteristics based
on partnership, trust and supplier commitment.82 The UK industrial participation policy
was introduced in the 1990s by the Ministry of Defence (MOD), under the strict guidance
of the Defence Export Services (DESO). When the policy was active,83 the main aim of
the Industrial Participation policy (IP) was to stimulate work and business opportunities in
order to maintain and possibly expand the employment of skilled personnel,84 in particu-
lar those engaged in high-value manufacturing, aimed at maintaining the competitiveness
of the UK export defence industry in terms of price and quality. It was also established
to secure access to the international defence markets and generate long term partnerships
with offshore companies.85 The offset requirements are focused on direct offset, including
co-production, technology transfer, capital investment and joint ventures. The IP model
contributed to the vitality of the UK defence and aerospace supply chain, providing vast
opportunities for UK defence suppliers to compete globally from a position of strength in
the production line and high-technology systems. The industrial strategy was beneficial
for the UK. It provided a healthy revenue stream for defence firms and created demand,
as evidenced by Matthews.86 The UK is the third largest defence exporter in the world.87
The primary concern of the IP was to ensure that UK’s defence procurement delivered
value for money. It recognized that this would not be achieved by simply acquiring the
goods or equipment at lowest cost, but to ensure long term gains in return. The IP adopted
a flexible, yet demanding approach. The offset obligation was set at 100% of the main
defence contract and no penalties applied for non-perfomance of offset demands.88 Re-
sponding to the 2009 European Defence Procurement Directive, the UK IP policy was
abandoned in 2012.
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Australia’s offset policy model changed in 1992 from a voluntary to a mandatory ap-
proach. However, today, Australia has no official offset policy but the Defence Industrial
Policy is embedded in the Australian Industry Capability (AIC). Under this scheme, there
is no penalty fee charged for offset non-fulfillment and no multipliers.89 Australian com-
panies are allowed to bid on contracts or work in partnership with large multinational
companies. The goal of this strategy is aimed at developing an Australian industrial de-
fence capability through partnership.90
The third approach is obligatory. The model imposes regulations which include penal-
ties for non-performance of offset obligations. This approach is common in government
acquisitions where staff lack the experience and skills to deal with offset.91 Multipliers
are also imposed by the vendor and are used as incentives to channel investment into cer-
tain areas, such as technology transfer.92 The ‘US Buy America’ Act attempts to protect
US businesses and labour by establishing a price preference for domestic end products
and construction materials in foreign arms acquisitions. This approach is inflexible when
compared to the other approaches.93
3.4 Offset Policies
Offset programmes involve a wide range of policy elements and each country employs dif-
ferent approaches in the execution of offset programmes. Countries that purchase defence
equipment use policy elements known as multipliers, penalties, credits and performance
bonds. All these methods are captured in Figure 3.4.
Multipliers are an essential feature in the execution of offset programmes and purchasing
countries acquire multipliers as an incentive to attract buyer countries with certain types
94
Figure 3.4: Offset Policy Elements
Performance 
Bonds
Policy Elements
Banking  
Credits Multipliers
Threshold 
Amounts
Percentage 
Values
Source: Author
of offset. According to BIS, a multiplier is “a factor which is applied to the actual value
of certain offset transactions to calculate the credit value earned”.94 It is often difficult to
satisfy the offset requirements from the purchasing country so foreign sellers seek to pay
attention to arrangements that will earn them multipliers. Where multipliers are provided,
the contractor can also request to expand the list of items eligible for the multiplier. The
multiplier adds weight, in terms of value, to certain types of offset activities. These multi-
pliers can vary from 0.1 to 5.6.95 In the Nordic countries, multipliers values have dropped
from 20 to 0.5.96 A multiplier can focus on technology transfers, infrastructure invest-
ments, education and training programmes. India requires a 1.5 multiplier for offset with
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small to medium sized, firms and a multiplier of 3 for technological acquisition within
defence-related research and development organizations.97 In some purchasing countries,
multipliers are not applied. According to statistical data released in 2003, the percentage
of transactions that did not include multipliers was 83% in Europe, 85% in North and
South America, 76.6% in Asia and 87.9% in the Middle East and Africa.98 In offset con-
tracts, there are clauses whereby a purchasing country can penalise the non-performance
of offset obligations. These are known as penalty charges. When offset obligations are not
successfully met within the expected time frame, countries can impose penalty charges.
The former offset policy of the United Kingdom did not include penalty charges if the
vendor failed to achieve its commitment.99 In Poland, by contrast, the offset provider
will be liable for liquidated damages. New Zealand also requires liquidated damages as
penalty charges.100
Credits are another practice used in the execution of offset process. There are two ways
in which credits can be used. In the first case, credits are earned before the offset contract
is signed whilst, in the second case, credits are earned when a company exceeds its offset
obligations. When an excess credit is obtained, it can be banked by the company and
can be used for the future. Credits can be transferred to another offset oblige but prior
approval needs to be granted by the country’s original offset obligor.101 Credits usually
are valid up to three to five years.102 In the Nordic countries, credit banking is widely
accepted but cannot be transferred to a third party and must be used within three years.103
Some countries require a certain threshold amount for an offset commitment. The thresh-
old amount is a percentage of the main purchasing contract value, above which it will
acquire an offset commitment. In the UAE, for example, the threshold is $10 million
dollars over a five year period.104 A Performance bond acts as a guarantee that allows the
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customer to make a claim in the event of a failure to perform its obligations, as defined
in the contract. The contract can include penalties and liquidated damage compensations
for losses that have been incurred by the customer as a direct result of the failure of the
exporter to perform in accordance with the contract. Countries may require performance
bonds, bank guarantees, or penalty clauses relating to liquidated or non-liquidated dam-
ages in offset agreements. In Brazil, the bank guarantees are allowed on a case-by-case
basis for a five year period.105
In India, when the period for discharge exceeds the period of the main contract, the ven-
dor is required to furnish a performance bond in the form of a bank guarantee. This
amounts to the full value of the un-discharged offset obligation falling beyond the period
of the main procurement contract. When a vendor fails to fulfill an offset obligation, a
penalty is assessed that may be paid by the vendor or recovered from the bank guarantee
of the main procurement contract.106 Countries require Offset Percentages sometimes up
to 100% percent of the value of the arms contract. For example in the UK, the offset re-
quirement percentage was valued at 100%.107 Similarly in Germany, Netherlands and the
Nordic regions (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden). In India, the offset discharge
is set at a minimum of 70% of the offset obligation.108
3.5 Does offset work?
At this point the question that arises is whether offset works as intended. This is a question
difficult to answer. The primary goal of offset programmes is twofold. One is the fulfil-
ment of the purchasing country’s defence needs. The second requirement to stimulate
growth and investment opportunities in the purchasing country’s economy. For buyers,
offset represents investments into emerging countries and are seen as a way of acceler-
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ating their own aerospace and defence development. From a seller’s perspective, offset
can help expand new defence technology opportunities requiring the skills to manufac-
ture weapons. Offset can also provide access into new emerging markets. Although offset
offers social and economic opportunities, it can also pose challenges.
The unique nature of offset packages makes it difficult to evaluate offset performance.
Moreover, the deficiency of public data on offset performance poses a significant problem
from an evaluation performance perspective, especially for a buying country. No country
reveals performance result of their offset programmes, globally, via the BIS Report.109
The BIS report publishes data on offset transactions for the US Martin argues that the
main problem with offset is the lack of public data. The availability of data and hence
all resulting analyses are reliant on the goodwill of industry and government to discuss
such matters.110 Willett and Anthony argue that the lack of standardised data is one of
the difficulties of finding instruments to measure such a complex activity.111 The growing
number of offset programmes adds to the problem scale. Finally, defence contractors are
reluctant to give away such highly sensitive commercial data.
The biggest challenge faced by purchasing states is not only whether companies can fulfill
their offset obligations but also if they can deliver in the expected time frame. The poten-
tial impact of this challenge is on a reputational and ethical risk. The risk for a supplier
is the loss of credibility and the financial loss that can put future business at risk. This
is because the buyer can also refuse partial delivery from the main contract. Companies
should ensure that they have the capacity to deliver offset programmes.
The UK Boeing AWACS programme experience in the 1980s proved to have a nega-
tive impact on employment and the generation of new work. The evidence suggests that
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the UK agreed an offset of 130% but very little new work resulted from this project.112
Boeing estimated that the offset package would create an estimate of 40,000 man years of
work over a period of eight years but instead statistics showed a total of only 37,500 man
years of work sustained in the UK industry.113 The Al Yamamah deal between the UK and
Saudi Arabia was another failure. The deal aimed to deliver 75,000 jobs in Saudi Arabia,
but only 1,600 jobs were created with just 300 of these being filled by the Saudis.114 There
have also been cases in Malaysia where findings concluded that it was difficult to mea-
sure and evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the offset its offset programmes.115
Offset in Malaysia did not promote research and development.116 Access of technology
has proved to be difficult due to the export regulations imposed by the Original Equip-
ment Manufacturer (OEM).117 A prime example of this happened when Malaysia bought
300 APCs from the Turkish company, FNSS Savunma Systems, which then became in-
volved in a protracted process of referral with its US technology partner to ensure that
the US International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR) were not infringed.118 During
Malaysia’s offset programmes, less than 100 new domestic jobs were created from work
packages linked to the country’s acquisition of British, US, German, Russian, Italian,
South African, Polish, French, Brazilian and, Turkish weapon systems.119
India’s experience in the 1980s with the licenced production of tanks, aircraft, and naval
vessels led to delays, cost overruns and failures.120 For example, the Vijayanta tank relied
heavily on imported components and production did not deliver for the 1965 war with
Pakistan. This resulted in India purchasing tanks from the Soviet Union, and evidence
suggests that this resulted in increased prices.121 India had to agree credit arrangements
with western countries to cover the foreign exchange burden. Moreover, the Soviet Union
imposed conditions on India for licence production, and was reluctant to provide techni-
cal information.122
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Offset can have an impact on the buying countries and selling country in terms of cost.
Offset can impose added cost on suppliers, particularly in the transfer of technology. Such
cost can lead to an increase in prices of defence goods and services that can impact on the
defence budget. In Finland and Sweden, mandatory offset imposes an additional cost in
terms of penalty charges.123 The Finnish Hornet audit found indirect offset to be costly.
The Finnish government paid an additional cost of 3 to 6% of the defence contract124.
Overall, the defence offset goals were in question, and it was difficult to ascertain if the
benefits of offset were greater than the cost.125
Offset can work in the emerging countries and offer benefits that they would have not
achieved, such as access to new markets, gaining technology skills for production and
building relationships with suppliers to secure future business. However, the true eco-
nomic cost of benefit of offset is difficult to estimate.
3.6 Summary
Offset plays a pivotal role in defence contracting. The proliferation of offset has increased
since the 1970s. About 130 countries have used offsets and industrial policy to achieve
economic development objectives. Governments use offset to justify purchases of arms by
highlighting the benefits that contribute to the vitality of the national economy. Purchas-
ing governments can choose to stimulate areas of investment. These areas can include
technology transfers, buy-backs, employment and investment opportunities. Moreover,
offset is a complex subject and gauging the true economic value of offset is difficult, due
to the lack of empirical evidence. Thus, the question remains, is it the supplier or the
vendor that benefits most from an offset programme. The main goal of this chapter is
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to provide the nature and global developments in offset programmes. The chapter eval-
uated the main characteristics of offset programmes and global policy initiatives. The
next chapter will aim to provide insights into the nature and extent of corruption in de-
fence, identifying the potential vulnerabilities of corruption that could potentially impact
defence procurement.
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Chapter 4
Nature and Extent of Corruption in
Defence and Offset
4.1 Introduction
Gupta argues that defence procurement is a channel that can potentially divert funds, and
have a significant direct impact on military expenditure.1 Corruption in defence is not
endemic, but it undermines political trust and breaks down political stability. The World
Bank (WB) estimates that about $1 trillion is paid in bribes each year.2 This is a concern
when national security becomes a veil to hide corrupt activity. The most common forms
of corruption occur in the defence sector in the form of bribes paid to middlemen, kick-
backs, embezzlement, fraud, manipulation of contracts and inflated commissions paid to
third party agents.
The defence sector is unique. Governments have the autonomy over the defence budget
and can choose to drive key investments in certain areas, such as technological develop-
ment, research and training by strategically selecting suppliers, partners and contractors
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that can contribute to the defence industrial needs a country. The decisions made by gov-
ernment are surrounded in secrecy, making arms deal prone to corruption. The defence
industry has been given “special” treatment compared to any other sectors like IT and the
oil industry. This is because arms contracts tend to be clouded by high levels of commer-
cial and national security under which government and military personnel are exempted
from public scrutiny.3
The defence industry is a competitive industry with new business, particularly in the
emerging markets. Some vendors offer lucrative deals, such as offset to differentiate
bidders. However, the problem is that a tranche of countries are perceived to have critical
levels of corruption and this may impact on offset.4 It has thus become a controversial
subject due to its opaque nature. Newspaper headlines cry out “offset deals spark calls
for transparency”.5 Leading defence companies face the danger that offset can be used to
channel through bribes by purchasing governments. Recent defence corruption scandals
show that existing practices and regulations are perhaps inadequate in preventing cor-
ruption in arms deals. Leading defence manufacturers, such as BAES, Rolls Royce and
Airbus have been under scrutiny by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) over illegal practices,
such as bribes, fraud and conflicts of interest involving arms deals worth million of dol-
lars. These illegal acts highlight the possible inadequacies of defence ethical compliance
practices when dealing with exports.
Contractual arrangements, such as offset come with a number of ethical considerations,
regulatory controls and costs that are imposed both by the buying country (importer) and
the selling country (exporter). Allegations of offset corruption have spiked concerns re-
garding ethical practices in the defence trade, especially with middlemen operating in the
international and domestic market. Certain countries have made attempts to curb corrup-
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tion linked to third party agents. For example, in 2012 India banned the use of agents
acting for contractors over allegations of graft.6 The Indian MOD cancelled the Rolls-
Royce contract due to allegations of $3.1 billion bribes.7
A 2010 report by Transparency International (TI) argues that offset raises the potential
for corruption in defence.8 The Report argues that the enabling factor leading to corrup-
tion is the high level of secrecy in defence and the lack of transparency making offset
a fertile ground for corrupt practices. The Report also recognises that because the arms
trade can involve high levels of expenditure, bribes can easily be hidden in the costs of
offset packages, especially in developing economies that lack the auditing and monitoring
infrastructure, and are characterised by poor governance.9
Although many allegations of offset corruption have been cited in newspaper articles,
they are often vague and evidence is lacking. However, corruption is likley endemic in
the procurement process rather than the offset contract? A clear understanding of the dis-
tinction between alleged corruption in defence procurement and the offset programmes
is needed. There is an obvious lack of quantitative data on corruption, and obtaining
evidence is not straightforward.10
4.2 Definitional Framework of the Arms Trade and Trans-
parency
The aim of this section is to offer a definitional explanation of the various terminologies
that will be used in this chapter:
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Arms transfers can be defined as the shipping of purchased arms goods and services from
one country’s government to another, or from a government to certain individuals. Goods
and services include a wide range of equipment that can be used for storing, launching
or servicing arms.11
The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency offers a comprehensive definition of
arms transfers as
“Weapons of war, parts ammunition, support equipment, and other commodi-
ties designed for military use. Dual-use equipment when its primary mission
is identified as military. The building of defense production facilities and
licensing fees paid as royalties for the production of military equipment. Mil-
itary services such as training, supply operations, equipment repair, technical
assistance and construction are included where data are available”.12
Yet, there is no universal globally agreed definition that exists. In some cases, interna-
tional organizations define arms transfers as “dual-use goods”. Dual use goods can be
referred to as goods that have both military and civil purposes.13
Transparency, is the voluntary disclosure of information on defence spending. Trans-
parency is the release of defence spending information by governments. This can allow
public scrutiny of government spending activities to ensure that public funds are not mis-
used. This fosters public trust in government and promotes good corporate governance.
Publishing data and processes should be reliable, comprehensive, clear and up-to-date,
making the process transparent and less susceptible to corruption. Arms transfer infor-
mation should be made publicly accessible to make the process open and transparent, and
also to provide trust and confidence in government expenditure.
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Players in the arms trade include states that the United Nations classify into two major
categories: developed and developing countries. This classification is based on economic
status, such as the GDP per capita income.14 Developed countries (advanced nations) in-
clude countries like the United States, Canada, Western European countries, Japan, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. These countries tend to have relatively high per capita income,
high levels of growth and security, sound infrastructure, good health care and medical
facilities, and are more technologically advanced than most other countries. Whereas de-
veloping countries tend to have lower levels of economic development. The World Bank
describes these countries as having poor educational facilities, lack of medical care facil-
ities, an unequal distribution of income and high levels of unemployment and poverty.15
Defence procurement can be defined as the process of obtaining a wide variety of goods,
services or works that are required by authorities to perform their day to day duties. For
example, these goods and services can relate to stationery, IT equipment and defence re-
lated purchases such as submarines, fighter jets, missiles and many more items required
to protect the national security interest of a country. The UN defines procurement as:
“goods and services manufactured which is intended to be used for military
purposes, which include defence equipment which can include submarines,
fighter jets, armored vehicles, munitions, missiles, and other services, it could
also be argued that defence procurement narrowly defined also covers the
procurement of “dual-use” technologies for example technologies that could
be used, in both military and non-military purposes”.16
The next section will discuss the features of defence procurement and the various vulner-
abilities that are associated with corruption risk in the procurement life cycle.
123
4.3 Nature of Defence Corruption
Defence procurement is considered to be a particular area for corruption and fraud.17 In
2016, fraud in the UK’s private sector cost an estimated £144 billion, and procurement
fraud was estimated to be £127 billion.18 Procurement payments are large purchases, with
limited scrutiny due to national security concerns.19
The Head of the Nigerian Bureau of Public Procurement claimed in 2009 that 90 % of
bribes in the Nigerian public sector were channelled through the defence procurement
system.20 Moreover, trillion of dollars spent on public contracts involving complex pro-
cesses provide further opportunities for graft to take place. There have been efforts in
Nigeria to tackle corruption, and a new system has been implemented whereby govern-
ment employees are able to track cost and expenses on contracts to ensure that contract
prices are not inflated.21
Defence corruption presents challenges not only for poor countries (see, CPI 2016), but
also has a direct impact on rich countries where perceived levels of corruption are lower.
The infamous Agusta Westland helicopter scandal attracted worldwide attention. It had
regard to inadequacies of India’s procurement processes, and, at the same time, raised
issues on the ethical conduct of western defence companies. In 2013, several Indian
politicians and military officials were accused of accepting bribes from Agusta Westland
in order to win the $750 million Indian contract for the supply of 12 Agusta Westland
AW101 helicopters.22 The former CEO of Agusta Westland allegedly received $51 mil-
lion in bribes to secure a new fleet of helicopters.23 In India, the former air force chief,
SP Tyagi received bribes from Agusta Westland as part of winning the 12 AW-101 heli-
copters deal.24 In October 2013, India suspended the supply of 12 helicopters to Agusta
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Westland because of bribery allegations.25 In early January 2014, India decided to cancel
the helicopter deal as it breached the pre-contract integrity pact which bars commissions
and bribes to middlemen.26 Thereafter, India scrutinised the procurement policy, and in
2016 revised it with the main aim to place responsibility and pressure on the OEMs to
enhance transparency in their existing overseas contractual relationships in India.27
Major concerns relate to unethical acts by senior management. The abuse of authori-
tative power seems to be misused by senior officials, where bribes are paid to middleman
to secure multi- million dollar defence deals. The case of the sale of a German submarine
to Greece is an example of where top level senior officials paid bribes to Greek offi-
cials to secure defence contracts. Former Greek defence minister was jailed after being
found guilty of receiving an Euro 8 million bribe from the German company, Ferrostaal.28
Bribery is not unfamiliar in the defence arena. Corruption in UK defence is a major con-
cern. In 2016, the UK Defence minister revealed that 44 allegations of corruption had
been referred to law enforcement agencies.29
4.3.1 Tracing Pathways of Corruption in Procurement
Defence procurement comprises multiple phases, including large technically complex
contracts with high levels of expenditure and secrecy. The components of complex weapon
systems are often manufactured by many companies working in different countries under
different national regulations, with multiple people involved in the process, such as sub-
contractors and procurement agents. This creates multiple opportunities for individuals
to commit to engage in illicit practices that can heavily impact on the defence contract
costs, through bribery, fraud, embezzlement, kickbacks and many other forms of corrupt
behaviour. Secrecy and national security are legitimate concerns for states, but they are
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also misused to obstruct government and military transparency, leading to vulnerabili-
ties in the procurement process. There are a number of procurement phases that can be
subject to corruption, from the initial start of the pre-tendering phase, the tendering and
evaluation phase to the end phase which is the post award phase. Figure 4.1 highlights the
possible risks of corruption that feature in the procurement life-cycle.
Figure 4.1: Tracing Pathways in the Procurement Life-Cycle
Source: Adapted from “Offset in the aerospace and defence industry”, International
Forum on Business Ethical Conduct for the Aerospace and Defence Industry (IFBEC),
visited online on 22 November 2017.30
Pre-tendering: This phase can be improperly influenced by government, seeking to obtain
illegal benefits.31 The award of contracts can be directed to specific beneficiary compa-
nies in order to receive a bribe or a kickback. In addition, the technical specifications
for a tender can be manipulated to favour a specific company through the solicitation of
bribes.32 For example, in the Agusta Westland deal the former Air Defence Chief Tyagi
allegedly manipulated the tender requirements in order to obtain the deal.33 Further, the
service ceiling for VVIP helicopters was tailored to meet the specific requirements of the
deal, from 6,000 metres to 4,500 metres.34 This decision was then contested by the secu-
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rity authorities based on the grounds of national security. This was done to allow Agusta
Westland to obtain the helicopter deal.35 The decision-making process can also be influ-
enced by external actors. Government can make poor decisions and may not necessarily
acquire weapons that are beneficial for a country’s strategic needs.
Tendering phase and evaluation: In order for companies to win a defence contract, they
need to submit a tender or a bid, and this is an important phase of the defence procure-
ment cycle. Agents can have direct communication with government; for example, in In-
donesia, agents and brokers are frequently consulted by government procurement officials
during the development of technical specifications for required equipment.36Corruption
can be solicited in the form of bribes to influence assessment and selection of these bids.
This can either take place between the bidding firms, offset authorities and third party’s
agents.37
Post-award phase: Once the main deal is concluded, an agent’s services can be extended
in the post award contract and retained for the main contract. The after sales contracts can
potentially also be used as conduits for bribes. According to the Indian media, part of the
Agusta Westland offset arrangement was contaminated with bribery. Allegedly, Agusta
Westland, reserved Euro 70 million to be transferred to companies through middlemen.38
As part of the deal only 30% would be used for engineering services and media handling
while the reminder of the deal would be used for bribes.39 This demonstrates a lack of
scrutiny and oversight given to defence contracts thus allowing corruption to contaminate
the defence contract.40 Discharge of offset obligations can act as an entry point for bribery.
Due to the nature of indirect offset, contractual conditions lie outside the main contract
and thus can allow a number of third parties and partners to structure other transactional
arrangements and projects. Additional requests can be made and solicited through the
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means of bribes.41
4.3.2 Determinants of Procurement Corruption
The previous section explored possible corruption pathways in the procurement process.
This section will aim to explain a few of the contributing potential factors that can lead
to corruption risk in the procurement cycle. These include contracts, conflicts of interest,
process complexity and weak oversight controls, though there could be many more detri-
mental factors contributing to corruption risks in defence.
Contracts: Defence contracts are often very large in monetary value and are kept secret,
providing an opportunity for illicit practices. Contracts are often technically complex in-
struments. The main defence contract usually incorporates offset which itself is highly
complex, as it leads to a wide range of activities outside the contractual arrangement.
Offset contracts also are given less attention than the main purchasing contract, and this
make them more prone to corruption risk.42
Conflicts of interest: During the bid evaluation, there could be a conflict of interest be-
tween the supplier and the bidder, and this can potentially harm both the main defence
deal and offset contract. High corruption risks are present when there is a lack of open
competition for procurement awards and when bidders are favoured, leading to an unfair
bias in assessment.43 Former Air Chief, Tyagis cousins and their firms were allegedly
received Euros 1.05 million from Agusta Westland UK to favour the deal.44 In addition,
key Indian individuals were middlemen, who were cousins of the former Chief defence
official, and were closely connected in this deal.45 This creates conflicts of interest and
opportunities for corruption, which ultimately may favour the award of a contract to a
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specific industrial entity.
Process Complexity: procurement of defence equipment can include a variety of indi-
viduals and agency bodies who are actively involved in the procurement. For example,
this can include governments, agencies, suppliers, brokers and many more figures that
play a part, both from the demand and supply side. Procurement decision-making can
also be led by a small group of technically specialized individuals who hinder oversight
by agencies that may not be effective or have may lack the required skills in managing the
process.
Military spending: procurement spending should be aligned with defence policy goals.
Defence policies should be clear and the military goals of the country and be linked to
military spending. However, many countries lack defined defence policies stating the se-
curity needs of a country which can lead to poor budgeting decisions.46 Countries in the
Gulf region experience conflict, during these times quick decisions need to be made and
quick expenditure is crucial, but rapid decisions could lead to poor oversight, lack of ac-
countability and a less rigorous focus on value for money in defence spending. Countries
in conflict can be used by suppliers, brokers, and middlemen to achieve a quick gain, and
they may see strategic urgency as a lucrative opportunity to bend the rules.47
Monitoring and weak oversight: in many of the developing countries, and generally in
less democratic governments, there are weak controls and oversight on defence matters
by parliament. Weak controls and oversight facilitates the risk of corruption and waste.
For example, a lack of defence budget transparency has posed serious problems on the
African continent.48 A problem facing such countries is the continuous supply of bribes
from more developed countries.
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4.4 Rich arms exporters vs Poor arms importers
There is no single definitive rule on what constitutes military spending and as a result,
the degree of transparency, and the way countries calculate military expenditure, differs.
Thus, transparency in public reporting on arms expenditure for some countries continues
to be a challenge. The aim of this section is, therefore to, identify key issues and causes of
military public spending. The levels of transparency will also be determined in both poor
and rich countries, both from the import(buying side) and the export(selling) perspective.
Table 4.1 shows the principal exporters and importers of major weapons between 2011
and 2015.
Table 4.1: Principal exporters and importers of major weapons, 2011-15
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2016, Armaments and Disarmaments and International
Security49
4.4.1 ‘Big Five’ arms exporters
The biggest five arms exporters in the world are United States, Russia, China, France
and Germany.50 The UK is positioned as the sixth largest defence exporter in the world,
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with its market share estimated to be £7.7 billion (US 12 billion dollars); that is 4.5% of
the estimated market share of global defence sales.51 Saudi Arabia has consistently been
the UKs top export market for the last five years, receiving two-thirds of the UK arms
exports in 2015.52 The defence procurement climate has evolved and many western coun-
tries have shifted to invest in the emerging economies due to the cuts in defence budgets
in the Western sphere. For example, oil-exporting countries, such as those in the Middle-
East have increased military spending, albeit their governance controls are poor. In 2015,
the US agreed defence contracts with some of the most vulnerable countries, such as
Saudi Arabia, Iraq and in South Korea. In 2015, the US signed multiple agreements with
Saudi Arabia to provide munitions and arms accessories such as the Patriot PAC-3 mis-
siles costing over a billion dollars.53 More recently in 2017, the US government sealed
a multi-billion dollar investment with Saudi Arabia. Western countries are increasingly
providing arms sales to countries that have high levels of corruption according to the 2016
CPI index. The Gulf States, for instance, are ruled by the monarchies enjoying both the
political and economical power and, as a result, there is a lack of judicial scrutiny leading
to weak governance.
A 2015 Transparency International study on Defence Anti-Corruption Index assessments
of national defence establishments identified five key corruption risk areas, dividing them
into political, financial, personnel, operational and procurement risks.54 According to the
report, the United Kingdom was the only country with an ‘A’ rating amongst the G20
countries, indicating that corruption levels in the UK are perceived to be low. The Report
found that the UK’s financial transparency and accountability controls were effective,
hence its procurement corruption risk is low. The findings also indicated that the UK
showed strong parliamentary scrutiny in defence institutions. However, concerns were
raised relating to the arms controls on exports to emerging economies, indicating poten-
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tial issues with control mechanisms. The UK and the USA are perceived to have high
levels of transparency in managing defence budgets though France, a top arms exporter,
revealed weaknesses in procurement and operations.55
4.4.2 Developing Nations as Arms Purchasers
Developing countries in Africa, Asia and South America are less-affluent nations and are
the main purchasers of foreign arms. In 2015, the value of all arms transfer agreements
with developing nations was 65.2 billion dollars.56 Developing countries are largely de-
pendent on foreign arms deals due to a number of factors which include the lack of tech-
nological expertise, skills and resources to manufacture weapons. The costs involved in
manufacturing defence weapons are high, so governments of developing countries often
prefer to purchase arms abroad.
The 2016 CPI index showed levels of corruption in these countries to be critical, and
is due to a number of reasons, including poor performance, lack of oversight and weak
legislative procedures.57 Developing countries also fail on audit procedures. All these
problems can lead to huge risks in the misuse of public funds. Countries that have a ro-
bust legislative framework, and well established policies, are likely to function effectively
and minimize the risk of corruption.
The procedural functions of the importing developing countries appear, in general, to be
weak. For example, India does not have a dedicated independent body which is respon-
sible for ethics, neither does it have a well developed anti-corruption system.58 Coun-
tries like China and Thailand also do not make use of external organisations to undertake
proper audit functions.59 Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, two of largest military
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spenders fail to publish their military budgets. Defence budgets in these countries lack
oversight. Corruption puts security at risk, as funds and sales of weapons can be diverted
to fuel conflict. This lack of public scrutiny helps increase corruption within the procure-
ment system, in which arms deals primarily the companies selling the weapons. Saudi
Arabia was the third largest global military spender in 2015, and publishes only a single
annual budget figure, with no specific details explaining the expenditure.60
In addition, Gulf regions continuously face conflict. For example, Iran is a fragile state
fueled with political tension and instability. Systematic corruption is thus likely, and is a
key part of the economic social and political context. TI reports that conflict is one of the
main drivers of corruption and fragility. Most of the recipient states that are exposed to
conflict and tension lack transparency in arms acquisition.
The G20 Report analysed data for 17 developing countries, including India, South Korea,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Cambodia. The countries analysed in the
Report contributed to an estimated $432.7 billion on military expenditure in 2014.61 The
G20 report shows that out of these 17 countries, only six published their defence budgets,
77% per cent revealed fractional budgetary information and 50% provided no informa-
tion to their legislatives.62 All countries examined had no oversight from a legislative
committee. Moreover, nine out of the 17 countries examined, had defence organisations
with an interest in businesses relating to the country’s natural resources.63 Also, it was
found that none of these countries had any control mechanisms, such as adequate audit
procedures. This confirms that there is certainly a lack of clarity in emerging countries’
defence expenditure.
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4.5 Offset and Corruption Risk
4.5.1 Offset Actors
It is important to understand the role of the main actors in the offset process before diag-
nosing the risks of corruption. The offset model involves four key actors. Governments
are the sole providers in defence and they play a pivotal role in the offset decision-making
process. Governments can use their authority, and can authorize officials to deal with de-
fence contracts. The supplier is involved in the execution phase of the offset obligation,
and is known as an obligee who negotiates and delivers the offset requirements. Third
parties also play an integral role in the facilitation of the offset programme. They have the
necessary expertise and skills, and provide support to the buying country to engage with
commercial partners on the projects, and interact with the offset authorities. Consultants
are also used as specialists and assist in providing technical support and advice and devel-
opment in the offset process. Third parties can involve a wide variety of participants such
as offset executors, brokers, companies and R&D centres, which engage in the process
providing orders, technology or training to offset beneficiaries.64
4.5.2 Risk Factors
Offset transactions attract a spectrum of risk. Indirect offset is perceived to be a com-
mon goal in the GCC countries, boosting the local economy by directing investments into
capital projects and joint ventures in the civilian sectors such as the electronics, pharma-
ceuticals, health-care, education and the ship building industry.65 However, as previously
discussed, indirect offset poses a potential corruption risk because they are negotiable
and open-ended with respect to the purchasing country. Such arrangements are selected
on a case-by-case basis, and offer unique compromises. Moreover, offset policies vary
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across nations, in efforts to create investment opportunities that stimulate growth in areas
outside the main contractual agreement. For example, investments can take place in the
promotion of tourism, building of factories, selling part of the sales of local production in
the vendor’s home country, and many other economic areas boosting initiatives unrelated
to the arms deal. Against this backdrop, the next section will provide the potential risk
features of offset, such as secrecy, politics, suppliers, third party agents, credit awards all
of which create opportunities for corruption.
4.5.3 Dangers of Secrecy
Secrecy, is an enemy of defence transparency. This keeps government processes, deci-
sions and actions hidden. This can lead to a security risk that can heavily impact on the
defence procurement process of the contract. Governments are protected from disclosing
public expenditure information and this can lead to a negative outcome on arms deals.
Deceptive activities are likely to occur in closed environments. Allegedly, BAE Systems
ran a network of hidden cash payments in a number of countries amounting to billions of
pounds from 1980 to 2010.66
4.5.4 Political Risk
Governments play a critical role in arms purchases and may use offset to exert influence
in the award of contracts for vested interests.67 Governments decide on the goods and
services that meet the national interest needs and the degree of expenditure. Governments,
can determine the levels of defence capabilities and can also select defence suppliers.
However, large defence purchases can be politically motivated to achieve gains in return
for contracts. Also governments determine the competition in a contract, and the winners
and losers. Moreover, offset transactions can be easily steered to other areas of vested
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personal interest to benefit the political needs of a country. The 1999 South African
arms deal not only highlights the inadequacies in defence procurement but shows that the
government exploited its interest to win over political support and as a result failed to
meet the expected objectives outlined in the offset contract. Politicians can solicit bribes
and divert funds that are allocated to the offset package.68 Governments can also use
payments as bribes to pay suppliers and to award contracts. Allegedly in 2010, BAES
was accused of paying millions of pounds in bribes to Saudi royalty for a contract worth
around billions of pounds to supply Tornado and Hawk jets.69 Corruption can take place
at every stage in the procurement process, because politicians can use their discretion to
drive decisions leading to a political risk (see Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2: Offset Risk
Source:Author
136
4.5.5 Suppliers
A supplier is a person or a company that provides goods or services to other companies.
In the defence sector, the supplier is a provider that supplies goods or services to the
procuring country. A supplier can offer payments or benefits to the buyer in order to gain
access to a contract in the offset package. The private sector plays a major role in the
supply side of corruption.70 Supplier companies are making benefits available to political
officials: for example, through the form of bribes. The main supplier companies may use
the offset package as a vehicle to offer benefits (bribes) in return for access to defence
contracts, leading to a non-compliance risk (see Figure 4.2).
4.5.6 Third Party Agents
Agents can potentially harm the contract, as agents and brokers can manipulate the pro-
cess by ensuring that the specifications favour their clients’ products. Third party agents
can often play a pivotal role in defence transactions and perform a wide range of functions.
In some countries, agents play a central function in securing the sale needs of a defence
company. Their functions can include building and maintaining new relationships with
public officials and decision-makers, accessing new potential business in regions, par-
ticularly where a market is difficult to access, complying with the relevant governance,
assisting with project facilitation, licensing and advising countries.71
Third party intermediaries have caused concern for many firms. The emergence of new
legislation for controlling bribery in the UK and US has prompted firms to take effective
measures when employing third party agents. Due diligence checks were conducted with
third party agents. Third parties and intermediaries represent the most vulnerable area for
corruption and a challenging area for defence firms to combat corruption. For example,
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the leading European aircraft consortium, Airbus, had made a number of questionable
payments to third party agents which had been facilitated through bribe payments to pub-
lic officials and politicians to secure arm deals.72 Airbus allegedly paid bribes to Canadian
politicians to induce Air Canada to purchase a large number of Airbus rather than Boeing
jets.73 In Greece, Airbus paid 41 million Euros in bribes to Greek officials to secure the
purchase of 20 NH-90 helicopters.74 German authorities suspect that bribes were paid to
enable the company to obtain contracts worth 3 billion Euros (2.3 billion pounds) in Saudi
Arabia and Romania.75 In October 2017, Airbus admitted to the UK authorities that it had
uncovered discrepancies in its disclosures about the use of middlemen paid to win com-
mercial export deals.76 Also, it violated US governing rules for defence exports known
as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Airbus has been urged to reform
its policy practices by providing additional information on third party agents used to win
export deals valued at $ 500,000 dollars or more.
In certain countries third party agents are prohibited. In the case of India, the hiring
of defence agents has been banned due to allegations that surfaced against the former
government over the purchase of 410 FH 77B Howitzers from Bofors of Sweden.77 How-
ever, some countries apply different approaches to third party agents. For example, the
UAE has a formal directive in place for defence companies seeking contracts with its
Armed Forces. Under this directive, agents are not allowed to participate in defence
contracting.78 In order to bid on government contracts, foreign suppliers need to be rep-
resented by a commercial agent or a corporate Limited Company.79
The offset project and its implementation is often carried out by third parties. Agents
may also have close relationships with government officials, and are usually former mili-
tary officers leading to conflicts of interest. A conflict of interest is the abuse of individual
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by, for example politicians and public officials for private ends. This arises when deci-
sions made are not fully aligned with the expected goals of the government or agency
with which they are associated. This may take the form of unlawful actions for services
rendered, by exploiting the use of sensitive information both internally and externally in
order to achieve personal reward. In a similar way, politicians may take illegal action that
is designed to benefit their party at the expense of the wider public. For example in 2010,
the deal struck between Agusta Westland and the Indian Defence MOD was tainted with
bribery and corruption allegations against key politicians linked to key middlemen play-
ers with corporate firms. Further, The Hindu newspaper cites that a British citizen had
allegedly received 60% of the total contract from Finmeccanica, the subsidiary to Agusta
Westland.80 It is believed that the British employee had close ties with the Indian Defence
forces. This was due to his father, a British businessman closely connected with India
between the 1980s and 1990s, and close to the Congress party.81 Today, more generally
third party agents are controversial subject and many cases of alleged corruption have
involved the use of middleman.
4.6 Corruption: Gauging the Extent of the Problem
Corruption in the defence sector is a global phenomenon which has attracted media at-
tention in newspapers, articles and in the academic sphere. Corruption in the military is a
problematic feature of poor countries. The extent and scale of defence offset corruption
has been widely reported and documented by Transparency International.82 In addition,
offset corruption is extensively reported by the media and often described in terms of,
“scandals” and “allegations”. A 2010 TI Report focuses on alleged corruption in defence
and offset, but vague provides no evidence to suggest that corruption exists in offset.83
One of the most controversial UK corruption cases is Saudi Arabia’s Al Yammah con-
139
tract with the UK’s biggest British defence BAE Systems. The infamous South African
arms deal was also linked to alleged corruption scandals in offset. The published report
by the South African Commission Inquiry in 2015 reports that concerns were raised on
how Ferrostaal managed the offset projects but the report Debevois and Plimpton Report
concedes that there was no evidence of any wrongdoing.84 The report suggest failings in
the procurement processes lacked transparency and accountability. In the audit findings
some of the procedural processes in the procurement of the arms purchases were not fol-
lowed by Armscor.85 In his case study, Haines argues that there were “substantial hidden
costs associated with offsets”. Despite such arguments there is a lack of evidence to prove
corruption.
Misleading claims against offset have sparked off a wave of concern in the defence arena
placing offset in an unfair light. The reality is that whilst offset can be used as a vehicle of
corruption, there is a lack of data to prove that corruption actually exists (see Table 4.2).86
For example, in the case of the 1999 South African Arms deal, the Seriti Commission
stated that corruption did not occur in the arms and offset deals due to the insuffiiency of
evidence provided.87
There is a need to assess the global nature and extent of corruption in UK defence along-
side offset programmes. According to the academic literature, little attempt has been
made to gauge the significance of corruption in offset as opposed to procurement. This
study has sought to examine newspaper articles, online reports, specialized articles and
websites, such as trace compendium, and the Department of Justice and Serious Fraud
Office was referenced to supply data. The data extracted are presented in Table 4.2, with
findings categorized according to key trends in procurement vs offset, type of corruption,
and proven vs alleged corruption in rich vs poor countries. The scope of this analysis
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covers the past 12 years.
Table 4.2, suggests that corruption is omnipresent, and has had an impact on both devel-
oped and developing countries. Bribery is an ongoing problem in the developing countries
when dealing with foreign suppliers from the developed countries. Corruption is common
in the developing world and more prevalent in developing countries than in rich ones. By
contrast, people from less developed countries are faced with the difficulty of establishing
an honest administration and a transparent political environment. Also, proven cases of
corruption appear to be entirely associated, with defence procurement. The purchase of
weapons occurs in a buyers’ market, where production capacities are higher than demand.
Tenders face limited scrutiny and, as a result, contractual details are not transparent, leav-
ing a window open to corruption. This area lacks transparency, from the tendering phase
to the end phase of the contract. Corruption cases appear to be contested on the procure-
ment side, in particular, via the awarding of contract in the pre-tender phase. Bribing of
officials in foreign markets seems to be a problematic feature for most countries, suggest-
ing that companies fail to monitor actions of agents abroad when dealing with foreign
governments. This certainly raises questions over the levels of integrity and compliance
practices in place for third party agents with vendor companies. The main agents behind
corruption in such cases have been executive levels of management, such as Chief Execu-
tive Officers(CEO), or political figures, who have engaged in illicit practices and initiated
the funnelling of bribes and lavish items using taxpayers’ money. Top level management
has a duty to set an example to staff and practice regarding good ethical behaviour. Yet
senior executives abuse their public roles in office in condoning malpractice and failing
to meet the expected ethical behaviour set out in the company’s code of conduct. The
majority of bribes have been facilitated by means of offshore accounts.
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Table 4.2: Nature and Extent of Defence and Offset Corruption
Corruption
Year Case Country Recipient
State
CPI
Index
2016
Proc. Offset Proven/
Not
Proven
Nature
1999 1999 South
African
Arms Deal
South
Africa
Developing 45/176 3 3 Not
proven
Bribery,
Conflict
of In-
terest,
Fraud
2001 Tanzania air
traffic control
system
Tanzania Developing 32/176 3 Proven Perjury
2002 Darylnn Case USA Developed 74/176 3 Proven Bribery,
Conflict
of In-
terest,
Fraud
2003 EADS cor-
ruption
scandal with
Vienna
Austria Developed 75/176 3 Not
proven
Bribery
and
Fraud
2004 Greek Sub-
marine Sale
Germany Developed 81/176 3 Proven Bribery,
Fraud
2007 Nigerian
Fraudulent
Arms Deal
Nigeria Developing 28/176 3 Not
proven
Fraud,
Bribery,
Embez-
zlement
2009 German Sub-
marine Case
Portugal Developing 62/176 3 3 Not
Proven
Bribery
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Corruption
Year Case Country Recipient
State
CPI
Index
2016
Proc. Offset Proven/Not
Proven
Nature
2010 VVIP He-
licopter
Scandal
India Developing 40/176 3 Proven Bribery,
Money
Laun-
dering
2016 Airbus Fraud
Allegations
France Developed 69/176 3 Ongoing Bribery
and
fraud
2010 Rolls Royce United
Kingdom
Developed 81/176 3 Proven Bribery
2012 Finmeccanica
manager ar-
rested in
graft probe
Italy Developed 47/176 3 Proven Bribery
2013 South
Korea’s
Purchase
AW-159
helicopters
Korea Developing 53/176 3 Proven Bribery
2013 Atlas Elec-
tronik
GMBH
Greece Developing 44/176 3 Proven Bribery
and tax
evasion
2014 Scandal
Rocks
Indone-
sia/Philippines
Indonesia Developing 37/176 3 Not
proven
Bribery
2016 Embraer Brazil Developing 40/176 3 Proven Bribery
Source: Author (See Appendix C for full list of weblinks consulted).
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4.6.1 Summary
This chapter has undertaken a critical review of corruption risk in offset and has identi-
fied the possible pathways that corruption risk can filter through the life cycle phase of
procurement. Defence procurement is a contested area with numerous corruption scan-
dals. It presents many challenges to both the importing and exporting countries. Table
4.2 highlights the nature of corruption, and clearly indicates that defence procurement is
a vulnerable area that can negatively impact both rich and poor countries. The evidence
suggests that corruption occurs in defence procurement rather than offset. The main deter-
mining factors leading to unlawful behaviour is due to the hidden nature and complexities
that surround the procurement of large arms purchases. Corruption seems to be an inher-
ent feature in particular with developing countries due to laxity in the legislative process,
ineffective governance in security and defence, and a lack of transparency and scrutiny
over decisions and defence budgets. Weak controls and oversight facilitate the risk of
corruption leading to waste in cost.
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Chapter 5
UK Case Study: Ethical Compliance in
Relation to Offset
5.1 Introduction
Corruption in the UK can be traced back to the 19th century when funds were siphoned
from taxpayers, and the solicitation of bribes by officials was common practice. Since
the 19th century domestic and international legislation has evolved to combat the cancer
of corruption. Modern anti-corruption practices are embedded in what is called a code of
conduct. Nevertheless, it has been argued by academics that there is still a lack of effec-
tive tools developed to control bribery and corruption, involving especially the benefits
paid to public officials.1 This has become a problematic feature in domestic companies
that operate overseas.2
Since the 1970s, there have been a number of high profile cases of corruption involv-
ing UK defence industry, including malpractice. For example, BAES allegedly facilitated
a number of corrupt deals on a global scale involving public officials in Saudi Arabia,
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Tanzania, India, Romania and South Africa.3 Both the UK Bribery Act and Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act (FCPA) were breached, and there was a deliberate failure to meet US
compliance standards. Also, Rolls-Royce and BAES suffered the stigma of corruption
allegations for many years, caused by deficiencies in compliance standards and weak
anti-corruption systems. Rolls-Royce admitted to falsifying accounting procedures by
concealing illegal payments to officials to win contracts in Indonesia, Thailand, China
and Russia. These payments totalled an estimated $500,000 dollars spanning the years be-
tween 1989 and 2013.4 This has not only damaged the global reputation of Rolls-Royce,
but has also impacted the company financially. A hefty settlement of £671 million was
negotiated by the US, Brazil and UK authorities over bribery and corruption allegations.5
Over the years, these cases have contributed to a questioning of the standards of integrity
and compliance in the UK defence sector. Transparency International argues that many
defence companies are lagging behind in terms of ethical corporate standards, leaving the
door open to corruption. A 2015 survey conducted by Transparency International sug-
gests that defence companies in Asia-Pacific, Middle-East, North Africa and Central Asia
provide no evidence of ethical and anti-corruption policies.6
UK defence companies are required to regulate employee behaviour to meet the core
values and expectations of the corporate code of conduct. This requires all defence em-
ployees, public officials, stakeholders and suppliers to conduct themselves ethically in
day-to-day business operations. The code of conduct contains corporate principles that the
International Business Ethics (IBE) forum recommends, based on integrity, fairness, re-
spect and openness. Businesses are required to do what is right by adopting these values.7
In this regard, reputation is key to a company’s performance, and failure to protect the
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“brand” is likely to lead to financial and reputational damage. Moreover, a strong reputa-
tion of an organisation can differentiate its products in highly competitive markets, where
buyers trust a corporate brand. Companies want to drive long-term economic investment
and maintain long-standing relationships with customers via a trusted reputation in the
commercial sphere, based on its corporate ethical standards.
The top 10 global weapon importers, Saudi Arabia, India, Qatar, USA, Australia, Canada,
UAE, Iraq, Brazil and Egypt8 seek added benefits called offset from their arms imports.
Offset has forced defence suppliers to invest in such deals, providing customer countries
with numerous potential benefits. Due to the changing economic and political landscape,
UK defence arms exporters need to assess the level of risk to ensure that they protect
their brand in foreign territories. The challenge is that countries have different regulatory
frameworks, and are governed in different ways, often characterised by a lack of trans-
parency. For example, in Qatar, there is no formal regime in place for dealing with offset.9
In addition, and more generally, there are no particular policies that govern contractors in
(foreign markets) except for procurement procedures. There are also no restrictions relat-
ing to former government employees working in the private sector.10 The Transparency
International 2015 survey suggests that Western companies in Asia-Pacific, the Middle-
East, North Africa and Central Asia are failing to meet robust ethical standards. Many
states in these regions have strong trade relations with UK defence companies, and UK
exporting companies need to comply with the relevant laws and regulatory controls. This
highlights the obvious fact that UK defence companies should manage business with high
level of integrity to mitigate possible corruption risks.
Alleged corruption involving multinational corporations, such as BAES and Rolls-Royce,
illustrate the difficulties faced by UK defence companies in exporting arms and agreeing
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linked offset programmes. The infamous Al Yamamah deal brought focused the spotlight
on the ethical conduct of UK defence firms, and represented the turning point for ethical
corporate compliance by UK defence exporters. BAES has been widely criticized both by
the media and anti-corruption agencies over its poor ethical performance in foreign arms
deals. The controversial Saudi case has highlighted the weaknesses in compliance with
UK governance and legal requirements, allowing corruption to occur in overseas sales.
To date, two global organisations have conducted research into the risks of corruption
in offset programmes. In 2012, Transparency International conducted an investigation to
review corporate due diligence practices, not least to identify defence corruption risks in
offset procedures.11 In 2015, the International Forum Business Ethical Conduct (IFBEC)
established a working group on offset to examine bribery and corruption risks in defence
offset programmes.12
Following these introductory comments, it is the purpose of this study is to answer two
main questions. Does corruption exist in defence offset programmes, and if so to what ex-
tent? Due to the sensitivity of the topic, the thrust of this research programme is to assess
the nature and effectiveness of corporate compliance in relation to offset programmes
undertaken by UK defence contractors. This dissertation has therefore taken a differ-
ent approach from Transparency International and IFBEC, and aims to assess the ethical
corporate framework of UK defence companies based on the conceptual framework illus-
trated in Figure 1.1 (Chapter 1). Three levels of analysis have been employed to assess
the effectiveness of ethical corporate frameworks in the UK defence sector.
This chapter starts by highlighting the existence of corruption, and the failings of ethi-
cal compliance in big multinational UK defence companies. This leads to the analysis
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of the UK as a country case study. Interviews were conducted with three top UK de-
fence firms to assess the nature and effectiveness of their corporate ethical frameworks,
especially in relation to offset programmes. Firstly, the effectiveness of corporate ethical
compliance was explored at the company level. Then, national legislation was identi-
fied, especially the legislative processes that defence companies incorporate within their
ethical frameworks. Finally, the effectiveness of international laws and regulations was
explored.
5.2 Evidence of UK Defence-Related Corruption
The UK has a world class reputation in defence manufacturing innovation and design
and is a major player in Europe and the United States, as well as globally in aerospace
and defence sales.13 Despite a world class reputation in defence exports, UK policies
and procedural processes have consistently appeared to fail in export dealings. Failings
of compliance and violations of laws have been a problematic feature since the 1970s.
BAES has allegedly been at the centre of corruption in countries such as South Africa,
Tanzania, China and Indonesia.14 Similar allegations have also dogged the UK’s lead air-
craft engine manufacturer, Rolls-Royce.
The next section highlights the poor ethical behaviour demonstrated by world class UK
defence exporters. Corruption has plagued the defence sector over the past decades and
has significantly impacted on defence procurement deals worth millions of pounds. The
main actors involved in these alleged corruption cases are governments and senior of-
ficials that network in countries which have high levels of corruption. The following
section offers a historical review of past and present unethical behaviour amongst UK
defence companies when selling arms to foreign countries.
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5.2.1 Case Study: BAES
In 1985, the UK Government won a large export contract with the Saudi government,
called the Al Yamamah arms deal. BAES made payments amounting to hundreds of dol-
lars to third party agents to gain favour for these defence contracts. The arms deal was
valued at £43 billion.15 In addition, a slush fund of £20 million was used to entertain
Saudi officials.16 As a result, in 2004, the Serious Fraud Office opened an investigation,
and two years later a decision to stop the case was taken by Tony Blair (UK Prime Min-
ister) on the grounds of national security, ostensibly because Saudi Arabia had threatened
to withdraw all its investments from the UK.17
In a 1999 case, the South African government purchased helicopters, submarines, war-
ships, amounting to billions of dollars. The deal included several European countries
signing contracts totalling around 30bn Rand (£4bn), as a means of upgrading South
Africa’s defence forces.18 The deal involved companies from the UK, Germany, Italy,
Sweden, France and South Africa. However, BAES had a significant role and influence
in part of the deal, because it used its agents working in South Africa. Reportedly BAES
set up a £100m fund, in 2007-08 to bribe South African politicians.19 Illegal payments,
such as bribes, were used to persuade the South African authorities to purchase British
Hawks instead of cheaper alternatives. South Africans have faced no charge over links
with BAES; however, intermediaries have been prosecuted over parts of the South African
arms deal.20
In another BAES case, the company signed a contract in 2001 with the Tanzanian govern-
ment to supply radar systems valued at £28 million.21 Funds were loaned from Barclays
Bank to finance the cost of deal. However, the World Bank confirmed that the deal was not
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financially cost effective for Tanzania as much cheaper options were available.22 Prior to
October 1999, an agreement was drawn up between BAES, Merlin International Ltd and
Envers Trading Corporation. Merlin a Tanzanian company controlled by a BAES Tan-
zanian agent agreed that the company (Envers) would receive 1% of the contract value
from BAES based in Panama.23 Also, an estimated 30% of the contract value would be
received by Red Diamond, an offshore company.24 In August 2007, a criminal case was
filed in Tanzania, charging the BAES Tanzanian agent with perjury and lying under oath
in connection with the radar deal.25 Later, in 2010, the SFO opened an investigation over
the Tanzanian radar deal. BAES admitted failure in keeping proper accounting records
relating to a £12.4m payment to a Tanzanian middleman for “marketing” purposes.26 A
settlement was reached with BAES paying £30 million as a penalty. The was a chari-
table payment to Tanzania.27 In January 2003, the Romanian government engaged in a
government-to-government deal, valued at £116 million, to purchase two-ex Royal Navy
frigates.28 This was one of the largest deals negotiated by Romania, whose government
had historically proven to be corrupt, especially in arms deals.29 The Guardian reports
that a third party agent allegedly received £7 million by BAES to fix the deal.30
In the early 2000s, the Czech Republic and Hungary decided to acquire new major com-
bat aircraft. The Czech Republic selected a bid valued at $1.8 billion. Later in 2002,
the deal was cancelled due to a massive flood. Funds were acquired by the government
for reconstruction. Negotiations still continued but for a smaller purchase. In 2004, the
Czech government signed a deal worth $750 million. This represented a lease contract for
14 Gripens over 10 years. Similarly, in 1991 the Hungarian government decided to lease
14 Gripens at a value of $500 million.31 One of the reasons behind this purchase was a
Swedish offset offer of 100% of the $500 million deal.32 Part of this investment included
30% investment into the Hungarian industry.33 Later, an inquiry was opened by the SFO in
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2004 to investigate BAES’s secret offshore accounts, and investigators found commission
payments to a subsidiary Red Diamond account in the British Virgin Islands. A BAES’s
agent, a husband of an Austrian politician, allegedly received millions in secret payments
from BAES for promoting the deal.34 An estimated £4 million was paid into overseas
accounts.35 Further, the Guardian newspaper stated that the deal was orchestrated by a
former high ranking civil servant of the UK MOD, who had been employed by BAES.36
According to the Guardian, the SFO charged a former BAES agent, Count Mensdorff,
for conspiring with others to give corrupt payments to officials and agents in the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Austria as inducements to secure the arms deal.37 Legal docu-
ments reveal that BAES had made a number of payments to various offshore companies
and third party intermediaries that were not subject to scrutiny and review. BAES admit-
ted to using “marketing advisors” to conceal payment checks in order to secure defence
sales.38 BAES had facilitated a number of disguised payments and failed to disclose the
origins of these payments. BAES pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States
and falsifying statements in contravention of its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
compliance programme.39 In addition, BAES violated US export arms regulations, the
Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
through falsely filing applications for export licenses for the sale of Gripen fighter jets to
the Czech Republic and Hungary.40 This resulted in the US Department of Justice (US
DOJ) imposing a fine on BAES of $400 million.41
5.2.2 Case Study: Rolls-Royce
In 2012, postings on the internet raised concerns about the corporate ethical conduct of
Rolls-Royce.42 This attracted global scrutiny, including the attention of the Serious Fraud
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Office. Between 1991 and 2005, Rolls-Royce paid more than $36 million dollars to agents
in Thailand to help secure engine sales to Thai Airways.43 Rolls-Royce and Rolls-Royce
Energy Systems (RRESI) bribed foreign officials in return for contract awards, equip-
ment, products and services.44 Rolls-Royce also admitted to hiring advisers in various
countries to secure contracts through the payment of bribes. Between 2003 and 2013,
RRESI, a subsidiary of Rolls-Royce paid an estimated $9.32 million dollars in commis-
sion payments and $1.6 million dollars in corrupt bribery payments to a Brazilian official
to help RRESI win a contract with a Brazilian company called Petrobras.45 In Indonesia,
Rolls-Royce allegedly paid £1.8 million and gave a Rolls-Royce Silver Spirit car to an
‘individual’ in exchange for contracts to supply Trent areo engines to Garuda Indonesia.
In addition, Rolls-Royce bribed a representative of a competing company to deliberately
submit an uncompetitive bid on a contract Rolls-Royce later secured.46
Corrupt payments have also been made to Angola. In 2008, Sonangol, a multinational oil
and gas company, put forward bids for a development project in Angola. Three projects
were awarded to Rolls-Royce and RRESI. In total, bribes of £2.4 million payment were
paid to agents.47
Further, Rolls-Royce failed to prevent bribery in relation to the extension of a £5m cash
credit to China Eastern Airlines (CEA) in exchange for purchasing aircraft engines in
2013.48 Part of these funds were used for lavish extracurricular activities, including four-
star accommodation. A middleman hired by the company paid bribes to Chinese pub-
lic officials, though Rolls-Royce later pulled out of both deals.49 Following the damage
caused to its global reputation, Rolls-Royce announced in talks with the SFO that it is
been strengthening its internal compliance procedures since 2008.
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The criminal activities that took place from 1989 to 2000 activated internal scrutiny over
Rolls-Royce compliance and anti-corruption procedures. In 2013, an independent ex-
ternal expert was appointed to review Rolls-Royce’s internal policies and procedures.50
The main goal of the initiative was to modify weak areas and adopt a new improved
compliance programme. As a result of the corruption offences, compliance needed to be
modified on the internal controls to ensure an effective system of internal accounting. In
addition, anti-corruption compliance programmes were employed, and robust policies and
procedures implemented to effectively detect and deter violations of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.51 Since then, there has been a significant change in corporate compliance
standards, including the publication of a new Code of Conduct ensuring that employees
understand the expected level of corporate behaviour required by the company.52 This
code was supported by a number of policies, including a revised intermediary policy, and
additional compliance checks, including external review diligence processes.53
Nevertheless, in 2014 Rolls-Royce was embroiled in further controversial allegations; this
time involving Indian Ministry of Defence. An investigation revealed that Rolls-Royce
had paid bribes to Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd to the value of £48 million.54 Indian law
bans the use of middlemen or advisers to obtain government deals. Legal practices were
violated in India.
In 2017, the SFO concluded that Rolls-Royce was involved in a number of bribery and
corruption offences, leading to serious ethical breaches of law in multiple countries (see
Table 5.1).55 The failure to secure corporate compliance was an area that needed much
attention by Rolls-Royce. The main perpetrators linked to these unlawful acts were “mid-
dlemen”, who have been influential in the solicitation of bribes in a number of highly
corrupt countries (CPI 2016). The Serious Fraud Office stated this was one of its largest
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investigations that ultimately led to a heavy financial settlement of £671 million by Rolls-
Royce. The DOJ agreed to a three year DPA to settle the charges. Part of this US
agreement covers the conduct of Rolls-Royce (in Brazil, Kazakhstan and Thailand).56
Rolls-Royce was charged with violating anti-bribery US laws (FCPA), but because of the
settlement, the prosecution was discontinued. Rolls-Royce Energy Systems (RRES), an
indirect subsidiary of Rolls-Royce, paid between 2000 and 2013 an estimated $35 million
in commission payments to bribe foreign officials. Part of the bribery payments were paid
by UK and US based Rolls-Royce employees, who assisted in providing secret informa-
tion to secure contracts in countries (Thailand, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Angola,
Iraq).57
5.2.3 Reputational Damage from Corruption
There is a fear that corruption is endemic in UK defence companies. Previous cases and
existing egregious evidence indicate that corruption has persisted since 1989 through the
2000s amongst the leading UK defence exporters.
The Rolls-Royce case negatively impacted on its financial performance, leading to con-
sequential financial effects in the supply chain, a loss in the company’s competitiveness
with key markets, a significant fall in the share price due to financial penalties imposed on
the company, a heavy impact on shareholder confidence, major restructuring in identified
weak areas, incurred by costly investigations and a potential weakening of the Rolls-
Royce financial covenant for pensions.58
Corruption allegations not only weaken the credibility of UK defence companies but
question the integrity standards of UK defence companies. It suggests a strong need to
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Table 5.1: Summary of alleged Rolls-Royce Corruption Activity
Agreements to make corrupt payments to agents in connection with the
sale of Trent aero engines for civil aircraft in Indonesia and Thailand
between 1989 and 2006.
Concealment of the use of intermediaries involved in its defence busi-
ness in India between 2005 and 2009 when the use of intermediaries
was restricted.
An agreement to make a corrupt payment in 2006/7 to recover a list of
intermediaries that had been taken by a tax inspector from Rolls-Royce
in India.
An agreement to make corrupt payments to agents in connection with
the supply of gas compression equipment in Russia between January
2008 and December 2009.
Failing to prevent bribery by employees or intermediaries in conducting
its energy business in Nigeria and Indonesia between the commence-
ment of the Bribery Act 2010 and May 2013 and July 2013 respectively,
with similar failures in relation to its civil business in Indonesia.
Failure to prevent the provision by Rolls-Royce employees of induce-
ments which constitutes bribery in its civil business in China and
Malaysia between the commencement of the Bribery Act 2010 and De-
cember 2013.
Source: Case No: U20170036, “Approved Judgment between Serious
Fraud Office and Rolls-Royce PLC”.59
strengthen internal compliance procedures in bribery. Corruption tends to be associated
with large defence procurement contracts and the level of scrutiny of such arms deals is
open to question. Agents and middleman have been closely linked to procurement con-
tracts, and the historical evidence indicates that bribes have been a problematic feature
since the 1980s. However, is this still the case? Are UK defence companies failing to
take adequate measures to deter corruption, especially, refraining from the use of agents?
Have UK defence exporters recognised the problem by significantly tightening up their
ethical compliance procedures? Have the anti-corruption laws stamped out corruption?
The purpose of this study’s fieldwork was to answer these questions.
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5.3 Adequacy of UK Ethical Compliance Procedures
UK exporters are major players in the international export market. Accordingly, these
companies are expected to promote high ethical standards through transparency, account-
ability and corporate integrity. To test whether UK defence companies are meeting their
ethical responsibilities, a questionnaire was circulated to 11 UK based defence compa-
nies. A copy of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix B. The list of companies
was provided by the ADS Group. The sample of companies included Airbus, Babcock,
BAES, Boeing UK, General Dynamics, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, Qinetiq, Rolls-
Royce, Serco, and Thales. Of the 11 defence exporters that were contacted by email,
three leading export companies accepted the invitation to participate in the survey. Whilst
this is only a 27% response rate, the three participating firms represent between 40-50%
of the arms sales of the 11 sample companies.60
5.3.1 Corporate Ethical Compliance
Ethical policy frames a company’s culture, its behaviour, actions and the level of expec-
tations required by the company. This guiding corporate policy is based on the code of
conduct. The code puts in place internal controls to manage ethical and compliance stan-
dards in an organization. Defence companies are increasingly expected to have a global
ethical corporate policy in place to guide employee decision making processes. Ethics
is a practice which extends beyond compliance, and has legal requirements. The central
focus is on individual behaviour, distinguishing right from wrong, by executing the val-
ues and principles embedded in a company’s code of conduct. This code will be based
on honesty, transparency, accountability and integrity and influences how a business op-
erates, both internally and externally (suppliers). It is a fundamental feature of corporate
policy that needs to be embedded in a firm’s culture, along with procedures to safeguard
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the company against corruption, so protecting its international brand.
Corporate governance in the UK has always emphasised corruption awareness, co-operating
with international governments to curb corruption. The UK government recognises that
corruption is an issue on a global scale. In May 2016, the UK government hosted a global
summit to advocate awareness and tackle corruption by addressing problematic issues in
the UK, such as corporate secrecy, government transparency regarding compliance abroad
- including efforts to strengthen enforcement laws governing domestic companies.61 De-
spite such concerted efforts, ethical concerns are still at the forefront, with high profile
corruption scandals linked to public officials, indicating in the UK. These cases have at-
tracted global attention, impacting negatively on the reputation of defence suppliers. The
effectiveness of corporate compliance procedures is therefore critically important in the
ethical functioning of a company as it provides a framework for organizational leadership.
The answer to question 1 (in the survey questionnaire) as shown in Table 5.2, confirms that
all companies publish a statement of values referred to as the global ‘code of conduct’,
and it applies to all levels of staff, including (Chief Executive Officers) CEOs, contractors
and suppliers. All respondents confirm that this code has a set of moral principles that
serve as a reminder to all employees that they must act with integrity. The most striking
result to emerge from the interviews is that company C was the only company that at-
tached a supplier code of conduct to every purchase order, so to minimize potential risks
of corruption. All respondents offered the code of conduct in multiple languages accessi-
ble by all employees, whether employed locally or at the international level. This policy
was in line with the Woolf Report’s recommendation one.62
With reference to question 2, company B, has not changed its core values since 1995.
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Table 5.2: Survey Questions of Ethical Compliance
Section B: Ethical Corporate Compliance Company A Company B Company C
1. Does your company publish a statement of
values on corporate ethics, of business con-
duct, honesty and transparency which set out
the principles, accountability and integrity?
Yes Yes Yes
2. Has your company’s ethical policy been
revised? If so, why? When was the last re-
view?
Yes Yes Yes
3. Number of employees in compliance 1000 80 140
4. Is offset subject to ethics policy? How is
offset incorporated into your ethics policy?
Yes Yes Yes
5. Does your company use third party agents
in offset projects? If so are they subject to
your company’s compliance policy?
Yes Yes Yes
6. Is a risk assessment carried out on external
offset business decisions? What are the pro-
cesses in place to monitor the ongoing com-
pliance in offset activities?
Yes Yes Yes
7. What internal control mechanisms do you
have in place for reporting ethical miscon-
duct? Is this reviewed by an internal or ex-
ternal committee?
Yes Yes Yes
Source: Author.
The interviewee for B stated “we no do not feel the need to change the values, because
this is a clear statement of values outlined in the code of conduct. Employees faced
with an ethical dilemma can refer to the core values set out by the organization”.63 This
demonstrates that the core values are clear and effective for the employees to understand,
when faced with ethical dilemmas. Interviewee A reports “that the code of conduct is up
for review and any revisions will be released in 2018”.64 Interviewee B confirmed that
the last update of the code of conduct was in 2014, “the three years are up, so it is now
under review, and towards the end of 2017 a refreshed version will be out”.65 Interviewee
C confirmed that the “global code of conduct gets reviewed every three to four years, as
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a matter of its good practice, and it is an evolving process, with the last review taken in
2016, and is currently under review due to good practice”.66 This is evidence to suggest
that all three companies review their code of conduct every three to four years and this
has been consistently applied. It was also noted that those companies which have head-
quarters in the US have to also comply with the US Defence Industry Initiative (DII),
based on a number of self-governing principles. All companies confirmed that their code
of conduct was currently under review. This suggests that companies have not changed
their code of conduct due to business needs, but as a requirement of good practice.
Reference to Table 5.2 question 3, interviewee A, reported that it has “thousands of em-
ployees working in compliance across the company and this includes the export compli-
ance, ethics teams and legal compliance”.67 Interviewee B, confirmed that “in the UK,
there are an estimated 20 strong team of compliance officers, and this includes part time
ethics officers. There are also an estimated 50-60 ethics employees in the US, and this
includes lawyers”.68 Interviewee C reported that “the UK compliance team comprises 40
full time members and an estimated network of about 100, which includes international
officers”.69 Data show these numbers vary across companies, and the amount of resources
in place for ethics differs vastly, and are not dependent on the size of the company. Over-
all, all companies demonstrate that compliance is a key function of the legal department.
In response to question 4, Table 5.2, the answers of all three respondents was yes. In-
terviewee A confirmed that offset policies have to be in accordance with the code of
conduct.70 Interviewee B stated that its “ethics policy is separate from offset policy. The
code of conduct is for all employees acting on our behalf, such as offset brokers and
agents, and there is an expectation in the policy, that all will act in line with the expected
standards, and the anti-corruption policy with respect to giving hospitality to public offi-
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cials, bribes”.71 This interviewee indicated that its website shows that its offset policy is
in full compliance with the company’s zero-tolerance approach to bribery and corruption
as set out in section 4 of its Global Code of Conduct, and the company’s Anti-Bribery and
Corruption Policies.72
Interviewee C stated that “offset is done in compliance with the company’s anti-corruption
policies”.73 There was no significant difference between the responses of the three com-
panies with respect to offset policies being aligned with anti-corruption policies. Impor-
tantly, all three respondents confirmed that their companies have a dedicated offset policy
in place, governing strict ethical guidance to employees dealing with such arrangements.
Third party agents, brokers, and all those dealing with offset are required to adhere to
corporate policy requirements. Offset potentially attracts a spectrum of corruption risks,
as indicated in Chapter 4, and require companies to prioritise anti-corruption policies and
procedures.
Cautious responses to question five were noted. Third party agents are a central fea-
ture of overseas sales, and are also employed to assist in discharging offset arrangements.
Agents have featured prominently in defence corruption allegations involving foreign de-
fence sales worth billions of pounds. All three companies replied yes to question 5, in
Table 5.2. Interviewee A stated that “all offset advisors are given rigorous training and
are continuously monitored”.74 “Due diligence checks are applied to all agents and third
parties, and all commissioned payments are closely monitored, with no payments trans-
ferred to offshore accounts. Ethics training is carried out annually, and the work of third
party agents is reviewed by an external lawyer”.75 Interviewee B confirmed “due dili-
gence is undertaken on consultants every two years and ethics training provided every
year”.76 Interviewee C stated “advisors are subject to an advisor policy and this sets out
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clear guidance and provides in-depth rules. All advisors are vetted under rigorous checks
by the group’s advisor panel, with all payments to advisers being scrutinised by the finan-
cial department and are subject to strict accounting controls. A strict-reporting system
and in-country visits monitor the work of the advisors. There are also two independent,
in-company, experts that monitor the advisor process”.77
Due diligence is a proscribed approach that all the surveyed defence companies under-
take to reduce potential risks prior to engaging in business relationships. An evaluation
of an agent is a crucial part of the due diligence process, as working with unscrupulous
agents can lead to ethical, reputational and financial damage. All respondents indicated
that explicit policies and practices are in place to evaluate agents and advisors to miti-
gate potential corruption risk. Also, all three companies conduct due diligence checks
and undertake ongoing training of advisors, including subcontractors. Importantly, all
third parties are also subject to ethical training, periodically indicating that employees
understand the expected boundaries of legal and ethical behaviour, both internally and
externally.
The use of an internal committee was a common approach that all three companies had
in situ. However, there were differences, some use an external committee whilst others
use an in-house committee. A principal finding to emerge is that company B stated that
occasional site visits are carried out on advisors as part of the monitoring procedure.78
Generally speaking, interviewees reveal that all companies possess compliance and mon-
itoring procedures for vetting agents. These control procedures ensure that third party
agents are closely monitored with adequate checks as required by the Woolf Report rec-
ommendation 12.79
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In response to question 6 in Table 5.2, interviewee A reported that “risk assessments
are carried out regularly and thoroughly and reviews on decisions are done internally
and approved by senior levels of management. This is monitored throughout the life cycle
process of offset activities”.80 Interviewee B stated “there are ongoing financial checks
and due diligence checks on suppliers”.81 Interviewee C stated that “this is an ongoing
procedure and factors that are considered are the political and economic country risks”.82
The company responses to this question were generally vague with, companies failing to
specify the processes for meeting compliance in offset activity abroad, signaling a poten-
tial weakness in this area.
With reference to question 7 in Table 5.2, interviewee A reported that “there is a ded-
icated ethics helpline and this can be accessed from anywhere in the world.83 All reports
are reviewed by an external committee and a call number is provided, which ensures
anonymity. Follow-up is assured within 28 days, with bribery and corruption cases esca-
lated to a member of the executive committee to oversee and investigate the problem”.84
Interviewee B stated that “there are designated ethics officers who are trained to investi-
gate certain cases, and if there is a major fraud or corruption issue, senior management
will be notified immediately, including the Vice President. Depending on the outcome of
the case we have a duty to report this to an external agency, only if certain laws have
been violated. There is a checklist we have to follow to notify certain individuals. Also,
all investigations need to be reported to senior individuals in the organization”.85
Interviewee C stated that “a dedicated ethics line is open to all employees with regard
to misconduct, and this can be accessed both nationally and internationally.86 A caller
message number is provided to the caller on the progress of the case, and there is an
option for anonymity.87 All ethics officers are provided with a standard script, screened
177
by external organization called ‘Navex’. In corruption cases the same process is involved
and depending on the nature of the case, it is escalated to the appropriate departments,
and dealt with by an in-house legal team, triggering the appropriate levels of action”.88
Interviewee B confirmed that it has an ethics website explaining how to contact the ethics
officer.89 There is a dedicated corporate email inbox messaging system but employees are
also encouraged to contact the company to report any unethical behaviour”.90
All survey respondents confirmed effective reporting channels to offer guidance and sup-
port to employees that are faced with ethical dilemmas. All three companies have ad-
equate monitoring mechanisms in place, such as an independent committee to oversee
corruption cases. This ensures that cases of corruption are screened by a committee, and
satisfies the Woolf Report’s recommendation 16.91 The importance of confidentiality is
highlighted by all respondents; it encourages whistle-blowers to report unethical activity.
The ethics lines can be used as an effective metric for companies to identify weak areas
and improve their compliance procedures.
The leading British arms supplier, BAES, has faced immense criticism relating to its
internal procedural processes and ethical conduct activities. For example, in Tanzania,
BAES admitted to failing to keep proper accounting records.92 In parallel, widespread
media coverage of the Al Yamamah deal cast the spotlight on allegations of corruption.
An inquiry was opened by the DOJ, and BAES pleaded guilty to making false statements
to the US government agencies and was fined $400 million dollars for criminal conduct.93
Consequently, as part of its plea agreement with the DOJ, BAES agreed to design and im-
plement an independent compliance committee to review ethical practices.94
Following the controversies surrounding the Saudi Arabia corruption allegations, BAES
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was forced by the DOJ to scrutinize its policies and practices. This led to the formation of
the Woolf Committee, comprised of independent external experts. The Woolf Committee
identified a number of weak areas and a list of 23 recommendations were formulated to
provide BAES with the highest ethical standards for day-to-day commercial activities.95
The aim of this Committee was to ensure that BAES operated in an clear, open, transpar-
ent and accountable manner in all business activities with its domestic and international
customer countries.96 After a comprehensive review of its ethical standards, BAES has
markedly improved its ethical standards over the last 10 years. In 2008, the Woolf Report
radically sharpened BAES ethical procedures, and this ignited a revolution in the ethi-
cal development of the company’s framework. In this context, the Woolf Report, more
broadly, has increased the vigilance of UK defence companies to reform their ethical
policies and reduce the potential for corruption.
5.3.2 National Ethical Compliance: The UK Bribery Act
The aftermath of the BAES bribery and corruption scandals led to unprecedented scrutiny
of UK laws by the OECD’s anti-corruption compliance policies.97 The OECD expressed
dissatisfaction with UK conduct and urged it to address deficiencies in its laws on the
bribery of foreign public officials.98 Further to this the OECD Working Group argued that
failing to take effective measures, including comprehensive legislation, will undermine
the credibility of UK legal frameworks, potentially triggering the need for increased due
diligence over UK companies and their commercial partners. The aim was to reduce cor-
ruption, particularly in developing countries. Thus, the UK has taken significant actions
to enhance the detection of corruption and foreign bribery. The Bribery Act sets out the
minimum acceptable behavioural standards. It also addresses the consequences of failure
to comply with the law resulting in imprisonment and penalties. Against this backdrop,
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this section presents the survey’s findings regarding ‘national’ UK ethical compliance.
In response to section C question one in Appendix B (Questionnaire), interviewee A
stated that “its company complies with the UK Bribery Act, and the raft of other leg-
islative governance and guidelines, such as the OECD, the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, and US rules. When it comes to jurisdiction, the US and UK are the major play-
ers”.99 Interviewee B stated that it complies with the legal requirements, arguing that
“there are two principal jurisdiction laws that need to be complied with, the FCPA and
the UK Bribery Act”.100 Interviewee C confirms that the “legislation followed is the UK
Bribery Act. This demands compliance in the UK; however, the FCPA is the equivalent
legislative practice in the US, and on an international level, it is the Combating of Foreign
Bribery guidelines(OECD)”.101
The UK Bribery Act introduced in 2010 is a strong legislative instrument, providing guid-
ance to UK companies to combat foreign bribery offences. Today, it is seen as one of the
major guiding enforcement laws that UK defence companies adopt in the compliance
framework. A common observation is that the UK Bribery Act is the regulatory legal
requirement that companies must adhere to when dealing with offset requirements on an
international level. In principle, having strong anti-bribery laws guide companies to re-
frain from engaging in corrupt practices. UK defence companies highlight that they are
mandated to conform to the most important international anti-bribery regimes, which are
the Foreign Corrupt Practices and Combating Foreign Bribery (OECD). Yet, the danger
is that UK companies may circumvent anti-corruption laws by using intermediaries to se-
cure contract deals worth millions of pounds. As discussed in Chapter 2, the prominent
anti-corruption polices (UK Bribery Act and OECD) advocate that foreign bribery in in-
ternational transactions be criminalized.
180
With reference to Appendix B (Questionnaire) in Section C, question 2, all respondents
replied yes. One interviewee commented that “legislation is difficult and a complex
area”.102 The responses to this question reveal that there is a certain degree of com-
plexity in the legislation. With reference to Appendix B, Section C, question three, only
one respondent replied “that when designing policies and procedures, the legal require-
ments such as the UK Bribery Act are embedded in the policies and procedures. This is
an ongoing process to ensure that we meet the expected compliance requirements.103
5.3.3 International Laws and Regulations
There is a plethora of international compliance requirements that UK defence companies
need to adhere to when pursuing defence arms sales in foreign countries. UK top defence
companies operate in international markets including Saudi Arabia, United States, India
and Australia, and access to international markets presents challenges for defence com-
panies. In addition, each nation has legal regimes that can vary from nation to nation.
Consequently, the UK Bribery Act, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and Combat-
ing Foreign Bribery (OECD) act as guidance to eradicate bribery and corruption when
contracting with governments and companies with overseas countries. UK exporters are
mandated to comply with anti-corruption polices set out by these customer countries.
Thus, the reduction of bribery and corruption has become a well-established and increas-
ingly important global requirement. This third level of analysis aims to assess whether,
and how, UK defence suppliers seek to be compliant with foreign legislative requirements
to reduce corruption, whilst simultaneously protecting the UK’s international reputation.
The below section presents the survey findings in international laws and regulations in
relation to offset.
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In response to section D, question 1, in Appendix B, interviewee A indicated that, “com-
pliance is dealt with by top legal firms, and all legislation is covered by them. These
legal firms will notify us of any contravention of legal requirements”.104 Interviewee B
confirmed that “each offset obligation will generally have one or more people who are
responsible for ensuring that the company is kept abreast of local laws. We also have
country teams who will report to corporate central office of any changes in particular
countries’ offset policies and laws”.105 Interviewee C stated that “there is a central team,
which is dedicated to monitoring changes in offset policies and laws, and appropriate
actions are followed to update policies and procedures accordingly”.106 All companies
surveyed reveal that dedicated teams deal with compliance changes in laws and offset
policies. With regards to changes in offset policies, this falls directly under the remit
of the compliance department. Importantly, there are dedicated teams placed in certain
countries who report directly to headquarters with respect to identifying any deficiencies
in the legal framework on offset. The responses to question 2 in section D in Appendix B
were covered in Table 5.2 question 5.
In response to section D, Appendix B, one interviewee stated that “we comply with the
laws, country policies and procedures”.107 Offset obligations in the UK will be monitored
to ensure that offset is consistent with customer offset policies. There are independent
assessors who oversee and monitor the foreign contract. There are a number of processes
that we have in place to monitor the offset programmes to ensure they are in line with the
countries’ offset policy requirements.108 Interviewee B stated that “there is a big in-house
legal team to ensure compliance with customer countries’ policies, and are committed
to protecting the company brand in all offset obligations. A senior committee oversees
adherence to offset policy, and the preference is to work and contract within UK and US
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laws, rather than local laws. If that is not adequate, then the ultimate decision is to with-
draw from doing business”.109 Interviewee C stated that “there is a central team, which is
dedicated to monitoring changes in offset policies and laws, and appropriate actions are
followed to update policies and procedures accordingly”. All respondents revealed that
compliance and policies is a central focus in protecting the brand in overseas countries.
5.4 Summary
Overall, all survey companies demonstrate that compliance to local and international laws
is at the forefront of corporate policy. All three respondents confirm that there are ade-
quate measures and processes in place to safeguard the company against potential bribery
and corruption risk. To support this, in particular one interviewee pointed out that if a
potential ethical risk is identified during the contract process all negotiations will cease
immediately. Leading UK companies are recognizing the potential risks in conducting
business in overseas markets. The survey firms are pioneering positive change by em-
bedding anti-bribery policies into their ethical frameworks to drive out corruption, thus
protecting the ‘brand’. All survey firms confirm that they couch offset policies and over-
seas legal requirements into the ‘code of conduct‘ in accordance to the Woolf Report.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is arranged into four main sections, and begin by summarising chapters 2
to 4. The discussion firstly focuses on the nature and impact of corruption, identifying
the key causes and consequences of corruption. It highlights the emergence of corrup-
tion indicators that have proliferated over the years. The nature and key characteristics
of offset are then examined, especially the varying offset approaches that countries have
in place. A comparative evaluation of the different policy perspectives of governments
is undertaken, from the perspectives of the UK, Europe, World Trade Organisation and
USA. Finally, the dissertation analyses the nature and extent of corruption in both defence
procurement government and offset, including a discussion of the global cases of defence
corruption.
This closing chapter focuses on drawing conclusions for the study, derived from the find-
ings of the analysis conducted in Chapter 5, and to a lesser extent Chapter four. Three
critical areas of analysis have been employed to assess the effectiveness of ethical corpo-
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rate frameworks in the UK defence sector. These levels of analysis play an instrumental
role in corporate compliance to guide employee behaviour in business activity in relation
to offset, and to avoid potential corrupt practices. Firstly, the effectiveness of corporate
ethical compliance was explored at the company level. Secondly, national legislation was
identified, especially the legislative processes that defence companies incorporate within
their corporate ethical frameworks. Thirdly, the effectiveness of international laws and
regulations was explored. Based on the findings of the research, policy recommendations
will follow, along with future work to be carried out in the field of defence corruption.
6.2 Chapter Highlights
The scholarship underpinning this study sought to highlight the relationship between cor-
ruption and the abuse in public office. Corruption is a subject that can be contested due
to its hidden nature, but a major problem is that no single definition of corruption ex-
ists. Corruption encompasses behaviour that is illegal, and can take several forms, such
as bribery, fraud, money laundering, and embezzlement of funds, improper political con-
tributions and extortion. The causes and impact of corruption, and measures to combat it
are central issues that are increasingly on the national and international agendas of policy
makers and organisations. Paulo Mauro confirms that corruption has a devastating impact
on the economy, as it affects growth and development. There is a need to understand the
causes and consequences of corruption. This may be helped by constructing a typology.
Two main distinctions can be drawn between petty corruption and grand corruption, with
the latter including unlawful acts of bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion and conflict
of interest. Corruption is a complex topic, due to its clandestine nature, and there is no
single approach to measuring the phenomenon.
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The emergence of corruption indicators has proliferated over recent years to measure and
combat corruption. The first single measure of corruption was developed in the 1990s,
and is termed the Corruption Perception Index 2016 (CPI). The CPI is an instrument
commonly used by many organizations and academics. There have also been numerous
anti-corruption initiatives in multiple jurisdictions, such as the FCPA, UK Bribery Act and
OECD. Corruption is difficult to measure, however, not least because measures focus on
‘perceptions’ of corruption. The interest in measuring corruption at firm level prompted
insights into the underlying causes of corruption at firm level. For example, the World
Bank used a firm level survey in various countries to assess the actual experiences and
perceptions of corruption. The OECD has analysed 427 international bribery cases and
found that public procurement is one of the most vulnerable areas of corruption. Public
procurement is a vulnerable area of corruption risk due to large contractual expenditures,
increasing opportunities for risk to enter into the contract. However, public sector corrup-
tion can have a major impact on state revenues, and a devastating impact on the world’s
economies. In the political arena, it undermines democracy, good governance and can
negatively impact on economic growth.
The contemporary emergence of offset was influenced by the economic and political cli-
mate following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. At the end of the Cold War,
global military budgets shrank significantly. This resulted in increased pressure from
arms sellers, and the arms market re-invented itself from a seller’s market to a buyer’s
market. In order for companies to survive in this competitive environment, lucrative add-
ons, called offset, became a common feature in defence markets.
Governments use offset to justify their purchases of arms by highlighting the benefits that
contribute to the vitality of the national economy. Purchasing governments can choose to
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stimulate areas of investment. These benefits can include technology transfers, buy-backs,
employment and investment opportunities. The proliferation of offset has increased since
the late 1980s. Purchasing countries are demanding offset benefits in varying degrees.
Corruption in the UK defence sector is a major concern. Defence is a unique environ-
ment, which is shielded from public scrutiny. The OECD argues that procurement is one
of the most vulnerable areas for corruption, with almost 50% of bribes worldwide paid in
this sector. Procurement is a complex area which comprises of multiple phases involving
large technically complex contracts, and multiple people in defence contracting. Govern-
ments play an instrumental role in the arms procurement decision making process, and
may use offset in the awarding of contracts.
Offset is a unique reciprocal arrangement that can potentially attract a spectrum of risk,
leading to potential corrupt activity in defence and offset contracts, as bribes can be so-
licited in favour of a contract award. In addition, third parties may secure lucrative con-
tracts worth millions of pounds in exchange for illegal gains. Proven cases of corruption
appear to be entirely linked to the defence procurement contract. The most common prob-
lem identified is the bribing of foreign officials. This suggests that companies are con-
sistently failing to meet their compliance requirements. Moreover, in recent years there
has been increased attention in corporate compliance due to the prevalence of corruption
in defence. In 2016, the UK minister of Defence (MOD) revealed that 44 allegations of
corruption in defence had been passed to law enforcement agencies, with four of these
involving the bribing of foreign public officials.
Offset is reportedly prone to corruption, sparking a global controversy, even though no
hard data exists to support the case, one way or the other. A 2010 TI Report focuses on
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alleged corruption cases alleged in defence and offset, but the lack of evidence fails to
‘prove’ such corruption is a problem. The thrust of this research has thus been to deter-
mine the nature and extent of corruption in UK offset arrangements. This is has been
achieved by interviewing senior representatives from the UK’s top aerospace and defence
suppliers to establish the degree of corporate ethical compliance, national and interna-
tional regulations and legislation, especially with regard to offset contracts.
6.3 Conclusions
As evidenced in Chapters 4 and 5, there have been numerous cases of corporate corruption
in UK defence and aerospace sector over the last decade. This has led to hefty fines, and
damaged the international brand of some of the country’s most iconic brands, including
BAES, Airbus and Rolls-Royce. Corruption is still a common occurrence in UK defence
deals. Past ethical behaviour demonstrates weaknesses that have been identified in com-
pliance and practice. For example, leading aero-engine supplier, Rolls-Royce has been
penalised for indulging in many illegal acts, such as funnelling bribery payments worth
millions of pounds across international continents.
6.3.1 Conclusions: Corporate Ethical Compliance
All three companies in the UK sample introduced formal ethical codes of conduct, and
for one of the firms this code has percolated down to embrace its suppliers. Importantly,
all three companies ensure the importance of ethics and integrity. The research findings
indicate that companies review their ethical procedures every three or four years, though
one company has not changed its ethical code since 1995.
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Corporate legal teams work closely with the ethical compliance executives, and a zero-
tolerance approach to corruption is mandated and clearly communicated to all levels of
employees, including CEOs. Companies have created global ethical helplines encour-
aging whistle-blowers to report ethical concerns with guaranteed anonymity. There are
effective monitoring mechanisms in place to oversee compliance and reduce, even eradi-
cate cases of corruption. The monitoring is carried out by an external committee.
Alleged and actual corruption tarnishes a company’s brand. Accordingly, following the
2008 Woolf Report recommendations, this study’s sample companies introduced a rig-
orous and robust set of ethical compliance measures that cover commercial operations,
including offset. This supports the conclusion that broad-based UK defence-related ethi-
cal compliance procedures are some of the most stringent in the world. Whilst corruption
allegations still surface, they are rooted in historical arms deals contracted before imple-
mentation of the Woolf Report recommendations.
6.3.2 Conclusions: National and International Legislation
Foreign bribery is an inherent feature of international transactions involving UK defence
companies. This raises serious ethical and political concerns. UK executives of the three
sample defence companies highlight that US laws, Foreign Corrupt Practice Act and Con-
vention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Trans-
actions are embedded in their policies and anti-corruption polices. There is therefore ad-
equate governance in place to monitor corrupt practices, including offset. Overall, all the
sample companies recognise that compliance with international laws is important to busi-
ness success.
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The three sample survey companies recognise the need to protect their brand when con-
tracting with overseas countries, especially those with demonstrably weak ethical com-
pliance regimes. The UK company interviewees state that strong measures are in place to
ensure that corruption is suppressed. These measures include due diligence investigations
carried out on both third parties and offset beneficiaries, imposing strict controls over their
activities. Importantly, all sample companies adhere to the Woolf Report recommenda-
tions, the UK Bribery Act and overseas legislative requirements, particularly those of the
US, but concern is expressed at the technical complexity of the legislation.
The UK companies also adhere to customer country legislation and regulations pertain-
ing to procurement - including offset policy requirements, such as India’s ban on the use
of agents, and corporate-in-house legal teams monitoring overseas customer compliance
procedures. The companies’ offset teams comprise multifunctional members from across
their organisations. These will be senior management, who are tasked with reviewing ev-
ery aspect of the offset arrangements to ensure that the company is acting in an ethically
‘clean’ manner. Significantly, the interviewees recognise that overseas sales and offset
deals are within the remit of both US and UK ethical compliance legislation and, as such,
the companies ensure that they operate according to international laws and norms of best
practice ethical behaviour.
6.3.3 Conclusions: The Global Context of Corruption
Defence is a field of endeavour prone to corruption. Military products are sensitive, but
so too are the promotional activities surrounding the deals. This especially affects offset,
because it offers the defence vendor the opportunity to gain a competitive edge. Thus, se-
crecy in negotiations is a hallmark of offset, due to the fear that the competitive advantage
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will be divulged to other companies. (Chapter 4.2 section 1.3.2)
Corruption is not a mono-problem, but appears in different guises. These different cor-
ruption pathways, as they have been categorised in this dissertation. (Chapter 4, section
1.3.1), include contractual malfeasance, government conflicts of interest, fraudulent ac-
tivity due to over-complexity, weak oversight and monitoring mechanisms and the un-
controlled use of Third Party Agents. Often the perpetrators of corruption will make
deliberate and concerted efforts to restrict transparency. An important finding is that
corruption and bribery in particular is a problem isolated largely to arms procurement
rather than offset arrangements (Chapter 4 Table 4.2). Of course, the evidence is derived
from secondary data, but nevertheless it acts to disprove the Transparency International
findings contained in its 2010 Report that offset is an inherently corrupt trading device.
Interestingly this research highlights that corruption is not confined to poor states, pos-
sessing inefficient accountability, transparency and audit processes, as it has been shown
that there are obvious dangers of fraudulent behaviour in states characterised by a high
Corruption Performance Index (Chapter 4, section 1.6).
6.4 Policy Recommendations
A series of recommendations have been drawn from the conclusions:
- The code of conduct plays a critical role in the functioning of an organization’s eth-
ical compliance practices. The applicable laws and regulations are underpinned in the
code of conduct to protect all employees deviating from their assigned duties. Defence
companies should update the code of conduct annually. Companies need to ensure that
global risks are identified on a continuous basis and the implementation of these risks
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should be aligned with the code of conduct and embedded in their anti-corruption poli-
cies. Further, changes the international laws and regulations should be publicly accessible
to all employees and communicated internally in a clear manner.
- Offset has been unfairly criticised in the past, but there needs to be acceptance that
such contracts do carry the potential for corruption. The problem is that the lens of trans-
parency in developing countries, where most of the offset deals are located, is far more
opaque than in advanced countries. More work needs to be done on developing a common
methodology that will subject such deals to greater scrutiny.
- The publishing of guidelines aims to enhance the reputation of an organisation and
decrease the risk of corrupt activities by raising employee awareness of the specific laws
and procedures. However, the policies presently in place are insufficient to regulate the
expected behaviours. Companies should enforce stronger vigilance and introduce effec-
tive monitoring mechanisms on high value projects, and all business activities carried out
by third parties should be closely scrutinized by an independent external department.
- It is one thing to have a full spectrum of compliance measures in place, but it is an-
other matter entirely to ensure that employees fully understand all aspects of the relevant
UK and US legislation. The interviews reveal a degree of intimidation felt by the inter-
viewees with regard to the complexity of the legislation. It is therefore essential that UK
defence companies have regular briefings and awareness training so that a comprehensive
and ongoing understanding of ethical compliance legislation is achieved.
- The UK Bribery Act is a strong piece of legislation to deter corruption but cases of
bribery and corruption are still prevalent in the UK. This questions the effectiveness of
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the present regulatory framework that helps to protect companies against illicit practices.
This is a clear signal that legal policies need to be tighter in relation to foreign bribery.
Stronger criminal sanctions should be enforced on companies that violate the laws set out
in foreign customer countries.
- Employees might not be comfortable with reporting misconduct to the ethics line man-
ager but they should be encouraged to report ethical concerns openly. Therefore, defence
companies should create multiple open reporting channels of communication to facilitate
the raising of ethical and compliance issues. This should provide employees with clear
and written instructions on how to access these advice lines from a specific location.
- Corruption is a worldwide problem that affects all countries and all sectors. The report-
ing of questionable behaviour is therefore critical to the success of a company’s ethics and
compliance programme. It should be in the interest of government and companies alike
to effectively tackle corruption. All defence organizations should make it their priority
to provide an ethics and compliance training programme, which provides clear guidance,
effective measures, comprehensive reporting mechanisms and clear accountability.
6.5 Future Research
Offset is an increasingly important strategic tool in the global export market. It is seen as a
key enabler for international growth and development. However, offset is a controversial
subject, with limited field research into the nature and causes of corruption. Hence, this
study is one of the very few empirical studies of corruption in offset. Further work needs
to be carried out, especially in the areas below:
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- Corruption in defence is a deeply troubling phenomenon for all countries. It adds cost to
defence projects, degrades market share values, reduces shareholder value due to the hun-
dreds of millions pounds paid in heavy fines as well as damaging a company’s brand for
years to come. More research is required to clarify the nature and extent of the problem,
and guide government policymakers towards developing appropriate coping strategies.
- This study has shown that offset has been unfairly stigmatised through unsubstanti-
ated allegations of endemic corruption. with reference to (Chapter 4, Table 4.2) clearly
demonstrates that near 100% of proven defence corruption is linked to malpractice in
procurement, not offset. Whilst offset is a sensitive area, not often aired in public de-
bate, there is a need for further research to demystify the subject. This research should be
directed at identifying the ethical weaknesses of implementing awareness of offset pro-
grammes in high CPI states.
- An underlying principle of the present study is the acceptance that corruption has the
potential to infect offset programmes, but that the scale of the problem is no worse and
indeed, probably better, than corruption in defence procurement. This judgement is sup-
ported by the research findings, though it is conceded that they are primarily based on
evidence trawled from the secondary literature. There is a fear, however that corrupt prac-
tices may be prevalent, but undiscovered, in overseas contracts implemented in foreign
countries, where ethical compliance regimes are non-existent or in a lamentable state.
Transparency International is developing a template to be used by stakeholders to ensure
that corruption in offset is identified and eradicated. Analysts, observers and researchers
in defence offset should be encouraged to further research this area, and make their own
contribution to the debate. There is a paucity of studies examining corruption and off-
set, and those that have been undertaken are non-empirical and influenced by stereotype
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comment rather than by primary research. The search for the truth on the nature and ex-
tent of corruption is challenging, but this fact should not act as a barrier to expanding the
boundaries of knowledge.
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Appendix A
Template email to participants
Dear Sir/Madam,
Following Brinley Salzmann’s email and the researcher’s telephone call, I would like
to thank you for your response and willingness to participate in this research study. I am
studying for a Masters by Research at Cranfield University. The research project will aim
to examine the corporate ethical policies alongside offset programmes.
This research has been reviewed, approved and granted ethical clearance through the
Research Ethics Review Board at Cranfield University. All the data collected will be
data-protected ensuring confidentiality. This will be used for research purposes only. The
data will be accessed only by authorised users in accordance with the Data Protection Act
(1998). You can be assured corporate anonymity is guaranteed. However, participation
in this study is voluntary and you can wish to terminate the interview at any given time
by advising the researcher. It will involve a semi-structured interview of approximately
30-45 minutes and this will be held at the companys location. The interview will be based
on the attached questionnaire. On completion of this project you will be provided with a
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copy of the original thesis.
I would be grateful, if you could confirm a date within the coming weeks. If you have any
questions please feel free to contact me.
Thank you for your co-operation in this research project.
Regards,
MSc by Research Student
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Appendix B
Questionnaire
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1Semi-Structured Questionnaire in the Defence Sector
Title: Corporate Ethical Frameworks in UK Defence Companies
The aim of this research project is to examine the effectiveness of ethical compliance,
especially in defence offset programmes.
The term ‘offset’ is an arrangement between a UK supplier and the buying country, in which
the UK Company invests a proportion of the contract in the investing country to generate
economic value and broader goals of the country. This can either take the form of direct or
indirect investment purchases.
Business ‘ethics’ refers to the application of ethical values based on key principles which
include integrity, honesty, fairness, respect, transparency and accountability.
Confidentiality
All information obtained will be for research purposes only. This is to confirm that you have
given your voluntary informed consent to participate in this research project. If you wish to
withdraw at any time, then you can opt to terminate the interview and information
provided will be deleted immediately upon your request. The data will be stored securely
accessed only by authorised users in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). All
information you provide will be data-protected and treated with the strictest level of
confidentiality. Please note that all corporate names will not be mentioned in this thesis. On
completion of this project you will be provided with a copy of the original thesis.
Section A: Company Data
1. Assigned Case No:
2. Respondent:
3. Company:
4. Number of Employees:
5. Year Company Started:
6. Products or Services:
7. Date and Place of Interview:
Section B: Ethical Compliance
Q 1. Does your company publish a statement of values on corporate ethics, which set out the
principles of business conduct, honesty, transparency, accountability and integrity?
Answer:
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2Q 2. Has your company’s ethical policy been revised if so why? When was the last review?
Answer:
Q 3. Number of employees working in compliance?
Answer:
Q 4. Is offset subject to ethics policy? How is offset incorporated into your ethics policy?
Answer:
Q 5. Does your company use third party agents in offset projects? If so, are they subject to your
company’s compliance policy?
Answer:
Q 6. Is a risk assessment carried out on external offset business decisions? What processes are in
place to monitor the ongoing compliance in offset activity?
Answer:
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3Q 7. What internal control mechanisms do you have in place for reporting ethical misconduct? Is
this reviewed by an external/internal committee?
Answer:
Section C: National Legislation
Q 1. What national legislation does your company comply with when dealing with offset?
Answer:
Q 2. Do you think that there is adequate national governance in place for offset programmes?
Answer:
Q 3. How does your company ensure that corporate compliance standards are in line with the UK
Bribery Act?
Answer:
Section D: International Laws and Regulations
Q 1. How does your company keep abreast with changes in laws and offset policy? How do you
communicate this to your staff?
Answer:
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4Q 2. Does your company extend your ethical compliance policy for agents? What are the processes
involved?
Answer:
Q 3. How do you protect your brand when dealing with overseas customer countries laws?
Answer:
Section E: Areas of Improvement
Q 1. How do you monitor your ethics policy to ensure that it is working effectively in regard to
offset? Ethically, can offset be improved?
Answer:
Q 2. What recommendations would you suggest to ensure offset are managed effectively.
Answer:
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Appendix C
Sources for Table 4.2
C.1 Notes
Procurement is goods and services that are procured by company and this case this would
be defence purchases which include defence equipment. Corruption Perception Index
2016 based on expert opinion from around the world, the Corruption Perceptions Index
measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption worldwide. Higher ranked coun-
tries indicate that these countries have a higher levels press freedom, robust integrity levels
and high levels of transparency in public expenditure, where a countries with lower scores
indicate that these countries are perceived to have poor levels of governance, press free-
dom is lower and judicial systems and transparency are weak, these countries face higher
levels of corruption in the form of bribery and extortion (https://www.transparency.
org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016).
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C.2 List of consulted weblinks
1. 1999 South African Arms Deal
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/6-key-findings-of-arms-deal-commission-
20160421
https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/arms-deal-report-statement-by-
andrew-feinstein-paul-holden-and-hennie-van-vuuren-20160421
https://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Erwins-arms-deal-offset-flop-
20150429
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmquad/205/205we05.
htm
2. Tanzania Deal with BAE
https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/uk-fraud-office-bae-set-for-another-
round-05777/
3. Darylnn Case scandal with Boeing
https://sites.tufts.edu/corruptarmsdeals/2017/05/05/the-boeing-tanker-
case/
4. EADS Corruption Scandal with Vienna
https://www.traceinternational.org/TraceCompendium/Detail/347?class=casename_
searchresult&type=1
https://www.traceinternational.org/TraceCompendium/Detail/111?class=casename_
searchresult&type=1
5. Greek Submarine Sale
https://www.thepressproject.gr/article/63799/Greece-sues-German-arms-
manufacturer-over-faulty-submarines
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/10895239/Greece-sues-for-7-
218
billion-euros-over-German-submarines-that-have-never-sailed.html
https://sites.tufts.edu/corruptarmsdeals/2017/05/05/the-greek-submarine-
scandal/
6. Nigerian Fraudulent Arms Deal
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-34973872
7. Ferrostal and Portugal Submarine Case
https://www.algarvedailynews.com/news/9496-germans-prove-6-4-million-
submarine-bribe-was-received-by-portuguese-elite
https://www.anagomes.eu/PublicDocs/66e9cd99-93f0-481a-8306-1e78d84cb8dc.
pdf
https://www.google.co.uk/search?q=Portuguese+case+allegations+of+corruption+
in+offset&oq=por&aqs=chrome.2.69i57j69i59l3j0l2.3840j0j7&sourceid=chrome&
ie=UTF-8&safe=active&ssui=on
https://sites.tufts.edu/corruptarmsdeals/2017/05/05/german-submarine-
sales-to-portugal/
8. India VVIP Helicopter Case
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Key-events-in-the-VVIP-chopper-
scandal/article14260615.ece
https://sites.tufts.edu/corruptarmsdeals/2017/05/05/the-indian-vvip-helicopter-
deal/
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/the-vvip-helicopter-scandal-steering-
towards-a-positive-response/
9. Airbus Fraud Allegations
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/sep/18/airbus-launches-internal-
corruption-investigation-after-guardian-expose
10. Rolls Royce Bribery Allegations
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https://www.traceinternational.org/TraceCompendium/DetailPDF?id=453&type=
1
11. Finmeccanica manager arrested in graft probe
http://www.reuters.com/article/finmeccanica-probe-idUSL5E8LN3X220121023
12. South Koreas Purchase AW-159 helicopters
https://sites.tufts.edu/corruptarmsdeals/2017/05/05/south-koreas-aw-159-
helicopters
13. Thyssenkrupps Atlas Bribery Case
https://www.reuters.com/article/atlas-corruption/thyssenkrupps-atlas-
ordered-to-pay-48-mln-euros-in-bribery-case-idUSL8N1IY3TY
14. Scandal in Indonesia and Philippines
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/04/17/1691068/dnd-probes-philippines-
role-indonesian-ship-bribery-case
15. Embraer Allegations
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/12/brazil-president-lula-convicted-
corruption
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/embraer-agrees-pay-more-107-million-resolve-
foreign-corrupt-practices-act-charges
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Appendix D
Informed Consent
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1 
 
INFORMED	CONSENT	FORM	
	
Title	of	the	Project:		
	
Transparency	and	Accountability	in	Defence	Offset	Programs	
Name	of	the	Researchers:		
	
Michelle	Charles	
Researchers’	Contact	Details:	
	
Cranfield	University,	Defence	Academy	of	the	United	Kingdom,	Shrivenham,	
SN6	8LA	
Michelle.Charles@cranfield.ac.uk		
Telephone	Number:	01793	785822		
Participant	No:	
	
	
Date:	
	
	
	
1. I confirm that I have been informed about the aim and objectives of this research project and 
agree to give my inputs. 
 
2. I understand that all personal information that I provide will be treated with the strictest 
confidence and my name will not be used in any report, publication or presentation. I have been 
provided with a participant number to ensure that all raw data remains anonymous. 
 
3. I understand that the information I provide will be used by Cranfield University for the purpose of 
research only. The data will be stored on a secure network accessed only by authorised users in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). 
 
4. I understand that the results of the research may be published in scientific journals, and an 
anonymised version of the data may be published in support of these results. 
 
5. I understand that I am free to withdraw from this project at any stage during the session simply 
by informing a member of the research team, for whom contact details have been provided. I 
also understand that I can also withdraw my data for a period of up to 7 days from today, as 
after this time it will not be possible to identify my individual data from the aggregated results. 
 
6. I understand that the discussions will be audio recorded and transcribed for analysis. The 
analysis will be only used for this research and for no other purposes.   
 
 
I confirm I have read and fully understand the information provided on this form and 
therefore give my consent to taking part in this research. 
 
Participant’s signature: 
 
 Date:  
Participant’s name: 
 
 
Researcher’s signature: 
 
 Date:  
 
One copy of this form must be given to the participant and one copy held by the researcher. 
 
 
 
 
Debriefing 
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2 
 
Thank you very much for your time today to assist with this research. As mentioned earlier the 
data provided by you will be treated confidentially and you are free to withdraw or change your 
responses for a period of up to 7 days from today. If you need to change anything you can let 
us know by contacting us through email or phone (details are on the first page of this form).  
 
If you are happy for us to contact you by email or phone at a later date if we have missed out 
important points or need to clarify any of your responses, please complete your contact details 
below.  
 
Thank you  
 
Participant’s contact details: 
 
Tel: 
 
Email: 
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